Maryland  Embryo Adoption : Religious Entanglement in the Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006 by Davis, Maggie
17.3_DAVIS_MARYLAND EMBRYO ADOPTION_FORMATTED.DOCX  (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/14 12:06 AM 
 
 
MARYLAND “EMBRYO ADOPTION”: RELIGIOUS ENTANGLEMENT IN THE 




INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 292 
I. THE PERSONHOOD DEBATES: A NEW-AGE APPROACH TO RESTRICTING 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA ..................................................................... 294 
A.  Quickening and “the Trade”: Early American Views of Reproduction and the 
Law ............................................................................................................................ 295 
B.  The Comstock Era: A Century of Sexual Oppression and Reproductive Control 
in American Law ........................................................................................................ 296 
C.  Embracing the Sexual Revolution: Expunging Comstock Policies and 
Expanding Reproductive Rights from Griswold to Roe ............................................ 299 
D.  Post-Revolution Social Backlash: Assisted Reproductive Technology, 
Personhood, and Neo-Conservatism in Post-Roe Politics ......................................... 303 
1.  Losing Ground in the Reproductive Rights Battle: The Rise of Neo-
Conservatism and Strengthening of the Right to Life Movement in the 
United States ........................................................................................................ 303 
2.  Personhood: The New Battle Cry of the Radical Religious Right ...................... 306 
3.  Scientific Advancement and Moral Outrage: Stem Cell Research ...................... 307 
II. THE “NEW NORMAL” OF AMERICAN FAMILIES: DEVELOPMENT AND 
ACCEPTANCE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND 
AMERICAN LAW ............................................................................................................ 309 
A.  A Brief History of Assisted Reproductive Technology Development ...................... 309 
B.  Adapting Existing Laws for Families Achieved through Assisted Reproductive 
Technology ................................................................................................................ 312 
1.  The Marital Presumption: Incorporating the use of ARTs into Existing 
Family and Inheritance Laws .............................................................................. 312 
2.  Establishing Parentage Outside of Marriage: Uncertainty for Single Parents 
and Same-Sex Couples ........................................................................................ 314 
C.  Establishing Embryonic Personhood Would have a Chilling Effect on the ART 
Industry and Deny Many Americans the Ability to Create a Family ........................ 316 
III. PERSON, THING, OR SOMETHING ELSE? WHY THE TERMINOLOGY 
MATTERS ......................................................................................................................... 317 
A.  Defining the Terms .................................................................................................... 318 
                                                                  
* J.D., 2013, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law (Baltimore, MD); M.A., Bioethics, 2010, Case 
Western Reserve University (Cleveland, OH); B.A., Psychology, 2010, Case Western Reserve University (Cleveland, 
OH). The author thanks Professor Paula Monopoli for her years of mentorship and Laura Ansley for providing additional 
insight into early American views of reproduction. She also thanks her parents, Barbara and David Davis, for their endless 
encouragement and support.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
17.3_DAVIS_MARYLAND EMBRYO ADOPTION_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/14  12:06 AM 
292 UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 17 
B.  Embryo Adoption is a Religious Construct That Confers a Personhood Status 
onto the Embryos ....................................................................................................... 320 
IV. MARYLAND STATE-ENDORSED “EMBRYO ADOPTION” IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT ...................................................................................................... 321 
A.  The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment Prohibits the State from 
Endorsing Religion .................................................................................................... 321 
B.  Section 10–438 of the Maryland Stem Cell Research Act is an Impermissible 
State Endorsement of “Embryo Adoption” and is Unconstitutional ......................... 323 
C.  An Easy Remedy: Revising the Maryland Stem Cell Research Act ......................... 326 
V. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 327 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 24, 2005, President George W. Bush publically endorsed “embryo adoption” as 
a “life-affirming alternative” to either donating unused embryos from in vitro fertilization (IVF) 
to research or destroying them.1 President Bush consistently opposed embryonic stem cell 
research throughout his tenure, often framing his position on the issue as pro-life.2 In 2001, he 
restricted the use of federal funds for embryonic stem cell research to stem cell lines that were in 
existence before August 9, 2001.3 Shortly thereafter, President Bush signed into law a bill that 
provided one million dollars per year in grants to the Department of Health and Human Services 
to increase public awareness of embryo adoption programs.4 
The 2001 Bush policy severely limited the availability of stem cells for federally funded 
research.5 In response, Maryland enacted the Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006 
(MSCRA)6 to promote and fund ethical stem cell research within the state.7 The MSCRA is the 
only Maryland law governing the disposition of unused reproductive material, including 
                                                                  
1 President George W. Bush, Remarks on Embryo Adoption and Ethical Stem Cell Research (May 24, 2005) 
(transcript available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/05/20050524-12.html). 
2 See Jaime E. Conde, Embryo Donation: The Government Adopts a Cause, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 273, 275 (2006) (describing President Bush’s reliance on “‘culture of life’ rhetoric to promote ‘embryo adoptions’ as 
the only alternative to dispose of cryopreserved (frozen) human embryos”). 
3 NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL REGISTRY UNDER FORMER PRESIDENT 
BUSH (2009), available at http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/research/registry/PDFs/FormerRegistry.pdf. President 
Bush placed additional restrictions on the embryonic stem cells available for research, mandating that the stem cells must 
come from an embryo—originally created for reproductive purposes—that is no longer needed for reproduction; that the 
progenitors provide informed consent for the embryos to be used in research; and that the progenitors receive no financial 
inducement for donating the embryo for research purposes. Id. Only seventy-eight stem cell lines met the criteria of the 
Bush policy. JUDITH A. JOHNSON & ERIN D. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33540, STEM CELL RESEARCH: 
FEDERAL RESEARCH FUNDING AND OVERSIGHT 1 (2007). 
4 S. REP. NO. 107-84, at 244 (2002) (describing specific appropriations authorized by Departments of Labor, 
Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, Pub. L. No. 107-116 (2002)).  
5 See JOHNSON & WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 1 (describing the limited availability of stem cell lines). 
6 Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. §§ 10-429-444 (LexisNexis 
2008) [hereinafter MSCRA]. 
7  MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 10-434(b) (LexisNexis 2008). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol17/iss3/3
17.3_DAVIS_MARYLAND EMBRYO ADOPTION_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/14  12:06 AM 
2014] MARYLAND “EMBRYO ADOPTION” 293 
embryos.8 Part of the MSCRA specifically addresses what happens to unused material from 
infertility treatments, and requires licensed IVF practitioners to make their patients aware of 
various disposition options for their unused material, including the options to donate the unused 
embryos for stem cell research, fertility treatment, or “adoption.”9 
Although some scholars use the terms embryo donation and embryo adoption 
interchangeably,10 the two terms are fundamentally different.11 The term embryo adoption is 
emotionally charged, and confers personhood status on an embryo.12 Many of the moral 
arguments that assert personhood status on embryos are overtly religious, or at least have 
religious undertones.13 Use of the religiously motivated term embryo adoption in the MSCRA 
confers personhood status on embryos in Maryland. However, it is impermissible for a state to 
endorse a particular religion under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.14 Because the reference to embryo adoption in the MSCRA confers 
personhood status on embryos in Maryland, it violates the First Amendment and is contrary to 
Maryland law and public policy.15 To remedy this issue, the Maryland legislature should purge 
any reference to embryo adoption in state law.16 
This article first examines the history of sex, reproduction, and morality in American 
law, including the development of the “personhood” concept within the reproductive rights 
framework.17 Next, it provides a general overview of the development of Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART), how American law has adapted to these expanding procreative technologies, 
and the chilling effect that conveying a personhood status onto embryos would have on the ART 
industry – hindering the development of modern American families.18 The article then explores 
the differences between embryo donation and embryo adoption and establishes the concept of 
embryo adoption as a religious, and primarily Christian, moral construct.19 Finally, this article 
argues that the use of the term embryo adoption in the MSCRA violates the Establishment Clause 
                                                                  
8  See MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 10-438(a)(2)(i)-(iv) (LexisNexis 2008) (listing the options for 
disposition of unused reproductive materials); compare Melissa Boatman, Comment, Bringing Up Baby: Maryland Must 
Adopt an Equitable Framework for Resolving Frozen Embryo Disputes After Divorce, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 285, 286 
(2008) (noting there is no Maryland law specifically governing the disposition of embryos in divorce proceedings). 
9  MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 10-438(a)(2)(i)-(iv) (LexisNexis 2008). 
10 Conde, supra note 2, at 280. 
11 See infra Part III.A. 
12 See Conde, supra note 2, at 283 (asserting that the term embryo adoption is legally imprecise because it 
implies that the embryo will actually be adopted).   
13 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Swire Falker, The Disposition of Cryopreserved Embryos: Why Embryo Adoption 
Is An Inapposite Model for Application to Third-Party Assisted Reproduction, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 489, 490 (2009) 
(describing religious text that declares frozen embryos to be “human beings that should be afforded all rights and 
protections accordant therewith”). 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see generally, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (holding that a 
Pennsylvania program in which the state reimbursed teachers at nonpublic religious schools for teachers’ salaries and 
instructional materials in secular subjects violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution due to “excessive entanglement between government and religion”). 
15 See infra Part V. 
16 See infra Part V. 
17 See infra Part I. 
18 See infra Part II. 
19 See infra Part III. 
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of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and therefore Section 10-438(a)(2)(iv) 
should be stricken from the Maryland Economic Development Code.20 
I.  THE PERSONHOOD DEBATES: A NEW-AGE APPROACH TO RESTRICTING 
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN AMERICA 
“One of the most fundamental Conservative views is that of being pro-life. 
Believing that every life has value and worth. That’s scientific because you 
know that, biologically, life begins at conception. That’s irrefutable from a 
biological standpoint. You can argue the theology of it. You can argue the 
philosophy of it. You can’t argue the biology of the beginning of life.” 
— Mike Huckabee, Former Governor of Arkansas21 
 
Despite Governor Huckabee’s beliefs and assertions, the legal concept of personhood is 
not equivalent to biological life.22 In fact, the law often creates fictitious legal persons to achieve 
desired policy outcomes,23 such as granting corporations personhood status for the purposes of 
free speech,24 but not for the purpose of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.25 
To address the question of whether or not an embryo is entitled to legal protections under the law, 
one must first understand the underlying political, social, and legal arguments interwoven with the 
status of an embryo. 
First, this section will assess early American views of abortion and contraception, which 
clearly denied personhood status to fetuses.26 Next, the social underpinnings behind abortion 
criminalization and contraceptive access in the United States during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries will be discussed.27 Third, this section will explore the quick expansion of reproductive 
rights during the mid to late twentieth century, including the re-legalization of abortion and 
contraceptive access.28 Finally, this section will analyze the introduction of fetal and embryonic 
                                                                  
20 See infra Part IV. 
21 The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast Nov. 12, 2012, 00:48), available 
at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-november-12-2012/exclusive---mike-huckabee-extended-interview-pt--2. 
22 See, e.g., SUSAN L. CROCKIN ET AL., ADOPTION AND REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY LAW IN 
MASSACHUSETTS § 11.2 (2000) (“It is patently clear that if non-viable fetuses are not accorded personhood under 
Massachusetts or U.S. constitutional law, embryos are similarly not entitled to recognition as persons.”); CARSON 
STRONG, ETHICS IN REPRODUCTIVE AND PERINATAL MEDICINE: A NEW FRAMEWORK 53–54 (1997) (distinguishing 
between the normative and descriptive sense of person, an element of which is life). 
23 See LOUIS M. GUENIN, THE MORALITY OF EMBRYO USE 11 (2008) (describing the use of the word person 
in various legal and philosophical contexts). 
24 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (noting that “[t]he Court as 
thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the 
First Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons’”). 
25 Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 119 (1988) (holding a corporation could not resist a subpoena for 
corporate documents by invoking the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination). 
26 See infra Part I.A. 
27 See infra Part I.B. 
28 See infra Part I.C. 
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personhood into contemporary reproductive rights debates, and its implications.29 
A.  Quickening and “the Trade”: Early American Views of Reproduction and the Law 
Early American jurisprudence differentiated between the existence of a biologically 
living fetus, with the potential for personhood, and the personhood of a fully developed child.30 In 
State v. Cooper, the New Jersey Supreme Court clearly distinguished at common law between the 
“condition of the child before and after the mother is quick”—holding that “[i]n contemplation of 
law life commences at the moment of quickening, at that moment when the embryo gives the first 
physical proof of life, no matter when it first received it.”31 Quickening is when a pregnant 
woman first becomes aware of fetal movement, and generally occurs between the twelfth and the 
sixteenth weeks of pregnancy.32 Willful abortion of a fetus before quickening was legal in early 
America, although the practice was generally covert.33 Many historians agree that abortion, 
usually completed by ingesting abortifacient herbs—colloquially called “the trade”—was 
relatively common.34 
Although willful abortion was illegal after the quickening stage, the law did not equate 
abortion to murder, and rarely resulted in any crime being charged.35 Early American law did not 
view an unborn fetus as a full legal person.36 For any infanticide conviction before the mid-1900s, 
                                                                  
29 See infra Part I.D. 
30 See State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. 52, 54 (N.J. 1849) (“In regard to offences against the person of the child, a 
distinction is well settled between its condition before and after its birth. Thus, it is not murder to kill a child before it be 
born, even though it be killed in the very process of delivery.”)  
31 Id. at 54 (emphasis in original). 
32 Andre E. Hellegers, Fetal Development, 31 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 7–8 (1970).  However, during a 
woman’s first pregnancy, she may not recognize the movements as quickening until as late as 20 weeks, and in 
exceptional circumstances the woman feels no movements throughout the entire pregnancy. 
33 See Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Taking the Trade: Abortion and Gender Relations in an Eighteenth-Century 
New England Village, 48 THE WM. & MARY Q. 19, 23 (1991). The death of Sarah Grosvenor in 1742, a young woman 
from a respected family in a small Connecticut village, resulted from a failed abortion. Id. at 19. The Grosvenor case, one 
of the only documented cases involving an abortion by surgical instruments in the time period, is unique for several 
reasons. Id at 19-20. First, it took over two years for the case to be tried despite rumors that Sarah Grosvenor’s death was 
caused by a failed abortion – which she was likely pressured into having by her former lover and a rural physician. Id. at 
21. Second, the case was likely heard because of Sarah Grosvenor’s death, not the abortion itself. Id. at 20. Third, even 
though there were other common and socially acceptable ways to deal with an illegitimate child at the time and despite 
evidence that he had coerced her to have an abortion, her lover was cleared of any wrongdoing. Id. at 19, 22. Fourth, the 
only conviction reached in the case was for the physician, who was sentenced to twenty-nine lashes and two hours of 
public humiliation in the town gallows. Id. at 21. The physician was never punished, however, as he escaped custody and 
fled to Rhode Island. Id. Finally, it was incredibly rare for a physician to be tried for an abortion-related crime, with no 
record of such crime in Britain or the colonies before 1745. Id. at 20 n.3. 
34 Id. at 19. Although abortion before quickening was legal, it was rarely referred to in correspondence or 
other forms of writing at the time. Id. When it was referred to, it was mentioned briefly and using euphemisms. Id. at 19, 
24. The high religiosity of 18th century New England, in which fornication was considered a sin, likely explains why even 
legal abortions were performed quietly. Id. at 23. 
35 Katha Pollitt, Abortion in American History, THE ATLANTIC (May 1997), available at http://www. 
theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/97may/abortion.htm.  
36 See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 22 N.J.L. at 54. 
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the child had to be born alive.37 A child being born alive was traditionally determined as a child 
that had “independent circulation” and was able to breathe without assistance outside of the 
womb.38 The distinction between a fetus born alive or dead, for the purposes of infanticide, 
indicates that early American criminal law did not view an unborn fetus as a full legal person. 
Interestingly, the subsequent period of criminalization of abortion and contraception was not 
fueled by the concept of fetal personhood.39 Rather, it was fueled by racism, sexism, and a 
growing social disdain for immoral or lewd behavior.40 
B.  The Comstock Era: A Century of Sexual Oppression and Reproductive Control  
in American Law 
During the late 1800s, American attitudes surrounding reproduction—specifically 
abortion and contraception—shifted drastically from the quiet condemnation and ultimate 
acquiescence in early America to moral outrage, ultimately leading to a criminalization of 
abortion and contraception that lasted approximately one hundred years.41 Anthony Comstock, a 
highly religious Christian who believed that even the mere availability of contraceptives promoted 
lewd and promiscuous behavior, spearheaded this shift.42 Several states at the time criminalized 
abortion, as well as the sale or distribution of contraceptives.43 Comstock ardently advocated and 
lobbied against the proliferation of “obscene” materials from the 1870s until his death in 1915,44 
and the commonly named Comstock Law of 1873—a federal law restricting the mailing of 
“indecent” materials such as information about contraceptives and instruments or substances that 
would prevent or end a pregnancy—was passed as a result of his lobbying efforts.45 
Although there was a fierce fight against abortion and contraceptives at this time, the 
motivation against these reproductive freedoms focused on the general concept of morality, 
specifically Christian morality, and not the philosophical concept of the personhood of a fetus or 
potential child.46 While the growing Evangelical population of the time crusaded against the 
                                                                  
37 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 767-68 (5th ed. 2010). 
38 Id. at 768. 
39 See Pollitt, supra note 35. Physicians, who sought greater professional legitimacy over midwives and 
homeopathic healers, largely fueled the anti-abortion campaign of the nineteenth century. Id. Some scholars have also 
attributed the anti-abortion attitudes of the nineteenth century to anti-feminism sentiments and nationalistic and racial 
biases against Catholics and non-white immigrants. Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See Roy Lucas, New Historical Insights on the Curious Case of Baird v. Eisenstadt, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS 
U. L. REV. 9, 9-10, 14-15 (2003) (analyzing the history of American law surrounding contraceptives, abortion, and 
obscenity between the Comstock era and the Supreme Court case Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)). 
42 See generally Helen Lefkowitz Horowitz, Victoria Woodhull, Anthony Comstock, and Conflict over Sex in 
the United States in the 1870s, 87 J. OF AM. HIST. 403 (2000) (describing Anthony Comstock’s personal background and 
religious underpinnings, as well as his rise to prominence in lobbying against obscene materials). 
43 See Lucas, supra note 41, at 10 (noting that both Massachusetts and Connecticut had such laws). 
44 Horowitz, supra note 42, at 431–34. 
45 Id. at 433; An Act for the Suppression of Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature and Articles of 
Immoral Use (Comstock Law), ch. 258, § 2, 17 Stat. 599 (1873). 
46 See Joan C. Callahan, Electing and Preventing Birth: Introduction, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE 
LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 256 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995) (describing the general pro-natalist views of the 
Comstock era, both from a secular and religious stance). Interestingly, this era corresponded with the Catholic Church’s 
first adoption of the idea that life begins at conception. See infra Part I.D.2. 
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“immoral” behavior seen in popular culture, such as blatant prostitution in large cities and public 
advertisement of abortionists,47 a number of secular thinkers of the era advocated against abortion 
because limiting the number of births would contribute to a “physically and morally weak” 
lifestyle.48 At its core, the Comstock era fought against “immoral” behavior.49 The issue of fetal 
personhood was absent from the argument; instead, the restrictive policies focused on controlling 
promiscuous sexual activity and preserving the societal goal of female chastity before marriage.50 
A key motivation behind many laws that restricted reproduction was a resistance to the 
growing women’s rights movement.51 State Comstock-like obscenity laws—which often 
criminalized contraceptives and abortion—sought to control women’s bodies and were created 
with the underlying philosophy that a woman’s role in society was almost exclusively as a 
procreator and caretaker.52 One scholar from the Comstock era noted that obscenity laws were 
relatively unheard of before the mid-1800s and that obscenity laws were likely enacted because 
“all our ladies read now.”53 Meanwhile, women in the late 1800s sought greater social equality 
through the women’s suffrage movement, which was later further realized during the resulting 
women’s rights movement that advocated for greater reproductive freedoms.54 The future 
scientific development of hormonal birth control and other novel contraceptives was largely 
incidental to the societal shift in views surrounding sexuality.55 The cultural disputes of the time 
were largely due to the changing roles of women from solely mothers and procreators to more 
comparable roles in the workforce. 56 
Another motivation behind Comstock-era restrictions on abortion and contraception was 
                                                                  
47 Horowitz, supra note 42, at 408.  
48 Callahan, supra note 46, at 256. 
49 See Horowitz, supra note 42, at 409-10. 
50 See CAROL MASON, KILLING FOR LIFE: THE APOCALYPTIC NARRATIVE OF PRO-LIFE POLITICS 9 (2002) 
(explaining that prior to 1975 anti-abortion activists distinguished abortion from the murder of a full human life); 
Horowitz, supra note 42, at 429-30, 433-34. 
51 Pollitt, supra note 35.  
52 See generally Martha J. Bailey, “Momma’s Got the Pill”: How Anthony Comstock and Griswold v. 
Connecticut Shaped U.S. Childbearing, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 98, 104–07 (describing the scope of Comstock-era state 
obscenity laws, including the criminalization of the sale of contraceptives and abortion); Holly J. McCammon, “Out of the 
Parlors and into the Streets”: The Changing Tactical Repertoire of the U.S. Women’s Suffrage Movements, 81 SOC. 
FORCES 787, 790, 800 (2003) (describing the change in women’s societal roles including the shift in focus away from 
women’s reproductive capacity). 
53 Henry H. Foster, Jr., The “Comstock Load”—Obscenity and the Law, 48 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & 
POLICE SCI. 245, 247 (1957) (quoting a 1788 conversation in which Dr. Johnson said, “The habit [of reading] was only 
then being acquired by women! The diversion spread, and books came to be read by the family, often aloud. What had 
been inoffensive to males had to be cleaned up for mixed company!”).  
54 See generally, McCammon, supra note 52, at 788-89 (describing women in the suffrage movement as 
moving “out of the parlors and into the streets” as a way of “redefin[ing] themselves as men’s equals in the public sphere); 
C.E. Joffe et al., Uneasy Allies: Pro-Choice Physicians, Feminist Health Activists and the Struggle for Abortion Rights, 26 
SOC. OF HEALTH & ILLNESS 775, 785 (2004) (detailing the second wave feminist movement in the 20th century that 
advocated for greater reproductive freedoms). 
55 See Nancy Schrom Dye, The History of the Relationship Between Women’s Health and Technology, in 
Women & New Reproductive Technologies: Medical, Psychosocial, Legal, and Ethical Dilemmas 12 (Judith Rodin & 
Aila Collins ed. 1991). 
56 See, e.g., McCammon, supra note 52, at 800 (describing the suffrage movement as combatting the idea of 
“separate spheres” for men and women). 
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the race-motivated fear that white, native-born Protestants were being out-populated.57 In the 
early 1900s, there was a concern of Anglo-Saxon white “race suicide” due to declining birth 
rates.58 In response, President Theodore Roosevelt spearheaded a pro-natalist campaign to 
encourage middle and upper class white Protestant women to reproduce, calling it their civic 
duty.59 The racist motivations behind some of the pro-natalist policies in the United States at the 
time coincided with the American eugenics movement and fit comfortably within its framework 
by encouraging the birth of children with “desirable” traits while discouraging the birth of 
children with “undesirable” traits.60 Despite the generally pro-natalist policies of the era, the same 
time period brought about the most severe anti-natalist policies designed to prevent the birth of 
“undesirable” children, including the sterilization of the mentally handicapped and habitual 
criminals and restrictions against interracial marriage.61 
Toward the end of the Comstock era, however, certain individuals became increasingly 
disillusioned with the criminalization of contraception and abortion.62 By the mid-1900s 
physicians—who had been some of the most ardent non-religious supporters of abortion 
criminalization—began expressing discomfort over unclear laws and the growing problem of 
unsafe, illegal abortions.63 The civil rights and women’s rights movements of the mid-1900s 
brought radical changes to how Americans viewed sex and reproduction, as well as a number of 
landmark cases that greatly expanded reproductive freedom in the United States after the 
Comstock era.64 
Unlike current cultural disputes over reproductive rights, where some convey a 
personhood status to embryos or fetuses to justify restricting access to abortion or 
                                                                  
57 Pollitt, supra note 35. 
58 Marcia A. Ellison, Authoritative Knowledge and Single Women’s Unintentional Pregnancies, Abortions, 
Adoption, and Single Motherhood: Social Stigma and Structural Violence, 17 MED. ANTHRO. Q. 322, 325 (2003). 
59 Id. 
60 See Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics, and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to 
Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (1996).  
The most passionate of American eugenicists…wished to develop a taxonomy of human traits and 
to categorize individuals as ‘healthy’ or ‘unhealthy,’ and ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal,’ within their 
classification scheme. Working under the presumption that most, if not all, human traits are 
transmitted genetically, the eugenicists encouraged educated, resourceful, and self-sufficient 
citizens to mate and produce ‘wellborn’ eugenic children. In contrast, the dysgenic were discouraged 
from reproducing. Harry Laughlin called dysgenic groups ‘socially inadequate’ and defined them to 
include: the feebleminded, the insane, the criminalistic, the epileptic, the inebriated or the drug 
addicted, the diseased—regardless of etiology, the blind, the deaf, the deformed, and dependents (an 
extraordinarily expansive term that embraced orphans, ‘ne'er-do-wells,’ tramps, the homeless, and 
paupers). 
Id. (citations omitted). 
61 Id. at 1-2. 
62 See, e.g., C.E. Joffe et al., Uneasy Allies: Pro-Choice Physicians, Feminist Health Activists and the 
Struggle for Abortion Rights, 26 SOC. OF HEALTH & ILLNESS 775, 778 (2004) (describing the physician response to 
criminalized abortion under the Comstock era).  
63 Id. 
64 See HELEN LEFKOWITZ HOROWITZ, REREADING SEX 443-44 (2002) (discussing the changing views of sex 
in the twentieth century, after the Comstock era); Pollitt, supra note 35 (noting the role civil liberties advocates played in 
promoting reproductive freedom and discussing several reproductive freedom cases). 
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contraceptives,65 the Comstock era objections to contraceptives and abortion were rooted in a 
larger culture war intended to encourage certain members of society to reproduce while 
simultaneously limiting the reproduction of other members of society.66 However, toward the end 
of the Comstock era, social acceptance of restricting the procreation of certain groups waned.67 In 
1942, the Supreme Court established marriage and procreation as “fundamental” rights while 
simultaneously holding that a state law restricting the procreation of habitual criminals, as 
applied, was unconstitutional.68 While Skinner began the shift toward greater reproductive 
freedom, decriminalization of contraceptives and abortion would not happen for more than twenty 
years.69 
C.  Embracing the Sexual Revolution: Expunging Comstock Policies and Expanding 
Reproductive Rights from Griswold to Roe 
The 1960s were a tumultuous time in the United States, and included the civil rights 
movement, the Women’s Liberation Movement, and a general sexual revolution in American 
culture.70 Corresponding with the changing societal views of sex, a number of states either 
repealed or stopped enforcing their Comstock-era laws restricting access to contraceptives.71 This 
practice made it difficult for reproductive rights advocates to strike down several of these laws, 
such as a Connecticut law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to married couples.72 In 1962, 
Planned Parenthood failed in its attempt to have the Connecticut law declared unconstitutional in 
Poe v. Ullman, on the grounds that since the law was unenforced, the physician plaintiff was not 
coerced into denying married couples contraceptives.73 In a strongly worded dissent, Justice 
Douglas advocated for striking down the Connecticut law on First Amendment grounds as an 
impermissible restriction of speech between a physician and patient.74 Alternatively, Justice 
Harlan argued that the Connecticut law should be struck down as a violation of personal privacy 
and liberty as granted through Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.75 
                                                                  
65 See infra Part I.D. 
66 Lombardo supra note 60, at 1-4. 
67 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding Oklahoma’s Habitual 
Criminal Sterilization Act, as applied, constituted invidious discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
68 Id. at 541. 
69 LAW STUDENTS FOR REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRIMER 1 (2009) available at 
http://lsrj.org/documents/resources/LSRJ_Con_Law_Primer_2d_ed.pdf [hereinafter LSRJ PRIMER]. 
70 See generally David M. Heer & Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman, The Impact of the Female Marriage 
Squeeze and the Contraceptive Revolution on Sex Roles and the Women’s Liberation Movement in the United States, 1960 
to 1975, 43 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 49, 49–50 (1981) (describing the sexual revolution’s impact on American women); 
SARA EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS 83-87 (1980) (describing how the women’s rights movement was intertwined with the 
civil rights movement). 
71 Bailey, supra note 52, at 106 (noting the repeal of Comstock-era restrictions on contraceptive distribution 
by seven states prior to Griswold); Gretchen Ritter, Women's Citizenship and the Problem of Legal Personhood in the 
United States in the 1960s and 1970s, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 17 (2003) (noting “the provisions of the more restrictive 
[contraception] laws were often unenforced”). 
72 Ritter, supra note 71, at 17-18. 
73 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 500, 508 (1962). 
74 Id. at 513–14 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
75 Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Ritter, supra note 71, at 18 (describing the far reaching impact 
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After the initial failure to strike down Connecticut’s anti-contraception law, Planned 
Parenthood successfully challenged it in the landmark 1965 case Griswold v. Connecticut.76 The 
Griswold Court, shying away from Justice Harlan’s position in Poe, established a constitutional 
right to privacy through a “[First Amendment] penumbra where privacy is protected from 
government intrusion”77 The Griswold ruling protected only the right of married couples to secure 
contraceptives, but the Court’s articulation of a constitutional right to privacy is the foundation of 
modern reproductive rights jurisprudence in the United States.78 
As a practical matter, the Griswold ruling was unsurprising within its greater social 
context.79 After the New Deal, the federal government had grown exponentially and there was 
general concern of governmental over-reach into more private matters protected by individual 
freedoms of contract and property.80 The marriage contract—firmly rooted in American common 
law—created an ideal protection against such governmental intrusion.81 Even in the Comstock 
era, sexual relations between married couples were protected, making enforcement of obscenity 
laws aimed at preventing “illicit” sexual acts nearly impossible.82 This made the 1972 case 
Eisenstadt v. Baird83 rather remarkable, as it weakened the assumption that non-marital sex was 
illicit sex84 by shifting the assumption of a constitutional right to privacy in issues of sexuality and 
reproduction from its foundation in the establishment of marriage to an individual right.85 
American views of sexuality were changing in the 1960s, with sex outside of a marital 
relationship becoming more common and more widely accepted.86 Additionally, the period’s 
exponential population growth—the Baby Boom—led a number of health officials to support the 
proliferation of contraceptives not as a women’s health measure, but as a means of combatting the 
public health threat of overpopulation.87 Contemporaneous with Americans’ changing views of 
sex was the medical development and introduction of oral contraceptives for women, known 
                                                                  
of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe). 
76 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965). 
77 Id. at 483. 
78 See LSRJ PRIMER, supra note 69, at 1. 
79 See Christy Scott, Review Essay, Constitutional Moments and Crockpot Revolutions, 25 CONN. L. REV. 
967, 971 (1993) (describing one scholar’s assertion that Griswold v. Connecticut was unsurprising at the time as a 
protection against growing governmental action and regulation in social welfare matters). 
80 Id. at 971-72. 
81 Id. at 972; see generally Milton R. Konvitz, Privacy and the Law: A Philosophical Prelude, 31 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 272 (1966) (describing the underlying philosophical reasoning behind the marital zone of privacy 
established in Griswold).  
82 Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 Yale L. J. 756, 778 
(2006) (observing that marriage protected a couple’s sexual acts from legal scrutiny). 
83 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
84 Dubler, supra note 82, at 808. 
85 Ritter, supra note 71, at 22–23. 
86 See Heer & Grossbard-Shechtman, supra note 70, at 50. (“Traditionally, the legal norm in American 
society was that sexual intercourse should be confined to persons legally married to each other. The so-called sexual 
revolution in the United States represented an increasing divergence of actual conduct from that stipulated by the norm, 
particularly for never-married women.”). 
87 See Beth Bailey, Prescribing the Pill: Politics, Culture, and the Sexual Revolution in America’s 
Heartland, 30 J. OF SOC. HIST. 827, 830 (1997) (describing the endorsement of population control in the 1960s as a public 
health issue). 
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colloquially as “the Pill.”88  Women, married or single, could only gain access to the Pill through a 
physician’s prescription, which often made it difficult for unmarried women to access.89 By the 
mid-1970s, however, the Pill was one of the most common forms of contraception for young, 
unmarried women.90 The social popularity of the pill, and the pro-population control views of the 
period, made William Baird’s challenge to a Massachusetts law banning contraceptives for 
unmarried persons a logical next step for reproductive rights advocates.91 
The Massachusetts law in question, which prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to 
unmarried persons,92 was a remainder from the Comstock era and no longer accorded with 
modern American views on sexuality, morality, and the role of government.93 Invoking the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court struck down the 
Massachusetts law, holding the state did not have an adequate justification to treat married and 
unmarried persons differently for purposes of accessing contraceptives.94 By relying on the equal 
protection argument, the Eisenstadt Court sidestepped the underlying social issue of whether a 
state could or should restrict access to contraceptives.95 In striking down the Massachusetts law, 
however, the Supreme Court shifted the concept of privacy away from an inherent element of the 
marital institution96 to an individual right of “reproductive privacy.”97 
Asserting greater reproductive freedoms based on the privacy protections in Griswold 
and Eisenstadt, reproductive rights advocates began challenging statutes criminalizing abortion.98 
Several cases prior to Roe v. Wade99 argued that anti-abortion laws violated this privacy right, 
with varying levels of success.100 Interestingly, the court in Abele v. Markle noted that “changed 
                                                                  
88 Id. at 827 (arguing that the 1960s sexual revolution developed separately from the introduction of oral 
contraceptives since physicians at the time rarely prescribed oral contraceptives for unmarried women); see generally 
LAURA BRIGGS, REPRODUCING EMPIRE: RACE, SEX, SCIENCE, AND U.S. IMPERIALISM IN PUERTO RICO, 129–41 (2002) 
(describing the scientific development of hormonal oral contraceptives in the twentieth century). 
89 Bailey, supra note 87, at 827. 
90 See Melvin Zelnik & John F. Kantner, Sexual and Contraceptive Experience of Young Unmarried Women 
in the United States, 1976 and 1971, 9 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 55, 63 (1977) (providing quantified data showing that a 
majority of 15-19 year-old never-married women—who had ever used some form of contraception—had used the Pill). 
91 See Jackie Gardina, The Tipping Point: Legal Epidemics, Constitutional Doctrine, and the Defense of 
Marriage Act, 34 VT. L. REV. 291, 298 (2009) (noting the argument that unmarried and married persons should be 
afforded the same reproductive rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
92 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 440-42. 
93 See Gardina, supra note 91, at 297–98. 
94 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454–55. 
95 LSRJ PRIMER, supra note 69, at 1-2. 
96 Ritter, supra note 71, at 22–23. 
97 Marc Stein, The Supreme Court’s Sexual Counter-Revolution, OAH MAG. OF HIST. 21, 22 (Mar. 2006) 
(emphasis in original). 
98 LSRJ PRIMER, supra note 69, at 2.  
99 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
100 See, e.g., Hall v. Lefkowitz, 305 F. Supp. 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (agreeing to convene a judicial panel to 
assess the constitutionality of New York’s anti-abortion law); Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800 (D. Conn. 1972), vacated 
as moot, 410 U.S. 951 (1973) (striking down a Connecticut law criminalizing abortion); Sasaki v. Kentucky, 485 S.W.2d 
897 (Ky. 1972) (upholding a Kentucky law that criminalized abortion and finding that the legislature is best suited to 
determine if abortion falls into the zone of privacy established by Griswold); Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 746 
(N.D. Ohio 1970) (finding that the state had a legitimate interest “superior to the claimed right of a pregnant woman” in 
ensuring the “fetal organism an opportunity to survive”). 
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moral standards” and “advances in medical science since 1860 [that] have made abortion in the 
early stages of pregnancy no more dangerous than childbirth” greatly weakened the state’s 
interest in criminalizing all abortions in an attempt to reduce “promiscuous sexual relationships” 
or protect women’s health.101 This changing view of sexuality and morality, and the growing 
acceptance of a liberty right to privacy, set the foundation for the landmark case in reproductive 
rights: Roe v. Wade.102 
In Roe, the Supreme Court of the United States struck down a Texas law that 
criminalized all abortions except in instances where the mother’s life was at risk.103 The Roe 
Court held that the constitutional right to privacy, developed in Griswold and Eisenstadt, 
encompasses a “woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,” whether the right 
“be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon 
state action . . . or . . . in the Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people.”104 This right, 
however, is not unlimited and must be balanced with the state’s interest in preserving the life of 
unborn fetuses.105 
Importantly, the court in Roe denied any personhood status to the “unborn”.106 In trying 
to establish a framework for balancing a pregnant woman’s privacy interest against the state’s 
interest in preserving the life of an unborn fetus, the Court adopted a trimester schema.107 The 
Court’s finding that a woman has an absolute right to an abortion in the first trimester,108 up to 
thirteen weeks gestation,109 is still more restrictive than pre-Comstock laws that permitted 
abortion prior to quickening.110 After the first trimester, Roe permits states to restrict access to 
abortion to protect the woman’s health, and only allows for state preservation of the “life” of the 
fetus if the fetus would be viable outside the womb.111 
Roe’s trimester framework, which essentially prohibited the states from protecting the 
life interest of an unborn fetus until the third trimester, was short-lived.112 After Roe, American 
views on sexuality, morality, and the family once again began to shift.113 With the rise of the 
Religious Right in American politics, and rapid medical and technological advancements, the 
                                                                  
101 Abele, 342 F. Supp. at 802-03 n.10. 
102 LSRJ PRIMER, supra note 69, at 5 (warning that Roe v. Wade must be seen in the context of the changing 
social fabric, particularly views on women’s rights and the Court’s recognition of liberty interests in other realms). 
103 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
104 Id. at 153. 
105 Id. at 159 (“[I]t is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another 
interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy 
is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly”). 
106 Id. at 162. 
107 Id. at 162–64. 
108 Id. at 163. 
109 Fetal Development: First Trimester, AM. PREGNANCY ASSOC. (Jan. 2013), www.americanpregnancy.org/ 
duringpregnancy/fetaldevelopment1.htm. 
110 See supra Part.I.A (describing quickening as occurring between the twelfth and sixteenth weeks of 
pregnancy). 
111 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64. 
112 See LSRJ PRIMER, supra note 69, at 19 (detailing the effects of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992), a Supreme Court case that restructured the abortion rights framework without overturning Roe). 
113 See Lisa Duggan, From Instincts to Politics: Writing the History of Sexuality in the U.S., 27 J. OF SEX 
RES. 95, 99-102 (1990) (describing the “moral panic” of the 1980s surrounding sexuality and other social issues). 
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stage was set for many fierce social battles.114 
D.  Post-Revolution Social Backlash: Assisted Reproductive Technology, Personhood, and  
Neo-Conservatism in Post-Roe Politics 
Post-Roe, America experienced a political “backlash” to the sexual revolution via the 
creation of the “New Right.”115 The neo-conservative New Right movement was categorized into 
three sub-movements during the early 1980s: economic conservatives, social conservatives, and 
religious conservatives.116 The social and religious conservatives, vocally opposed abortion and 
some even opposed the proliferation of contraceptives.117 The rise of the “New Right” in the 
1980s, which has remained a powerful force through the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
was primarily a reaction against the changing definition of family in the United States.118 This 
threat to the “traditional” family, in which a man and woman were married with only marital 
offspring, underpinned the social and political battles of the next three decades.119 
In framing social issues like abortion as “baby-killing”, and bringing the Pro-Life 
movement into political predominance, the New Right changed the conversation surrounding 
abortion and reproductive freedom.120 This section will look at the rise of personhood in modern 
American politics regarding reproductive issues.121 First, the section will explore the limitations 
placed on reproductive rights after Roe and the rise of the Religious Right.122 Second, this section 
will discuss the struggles of the Religious Right’s anti-abortion and anti-contraception campaigns, 
which are founded on the religious concept of “personhood”.123 Finally, this section will describe 
the hindrance “personhood” places on scientific development—specifically, stem cell research.124 
1.  Losing Ground in the Reproductive Rights Battle: The Rise of Neo-Conservatism and 
Strengthening of the Right to Life Movement in the United States 
The Right to Life movement began during the sexual revolution of the 1960s, but did not 
gain prominence until after Roe.125 Roe altered the discourse surrounding abortion from a 
                                                                  
114 See Dennis R. Hoover & Kevin R. den Dulk, Christian Conservatives Go to Court: Religion and Legal 
Mobilization in the United States and Canada, 25 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 9, 9–10 (2004) (describing the reemergence of 
socially conservative Christians as vocal players in the American culture wars, and noting the general tendency of 
Americans to be “exceptionally litigious”). 
115 See Pamela Johnston Conover, The Mobilization of the New Right: A Test of Various Explanations, 36 
POL. RES. Q. 632, 632 (1983) (describing the social backlash of the time and the creation of the “New Right”). 
116 Id. 
117 See id. (describing Right to Life and Stop E.R.A. [the Equal Rights Amendment] as single-issue interest 
groups that formed part of the New Right, and opposed abortion and other feminist policies that threatened to change 
traditional family structures and dynamics). 
118 See id. at 645–46. 
119 See infra Part I.D.1–3. 
120 See infra Part I.D.1 
121 See infra Part I.D.1–3. 
122 See infra Part I.D.1. 
123 See infra Part I.D.2. 
124 See infra Part I.D.3. 
125 See generally Keith Cassidy, Interpreting the Pro-Life Movement: Recurrent Themes and Recent Trends, 
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discussion about population control and eugenics to a rights-based justification for preserving the 
right of women to seek elective abortions in the United States.126 After Roe, anti-abortion activists 
fought political “edge” issues, such as prohibitions on the use of federal funds for abortions, with 
a good deal of success.127 These “edge” issues slowly curtailed the broad-stroke rights established 
in Roe.128 
One of the biggest accomplishments of post-Roe anti-abortion activists was the passage 
of the Hyde Amendment in 1977.129 The Hyde Amendment is a federal law prohibiting the use of 
federal funds for any elective abortion, which by default prohibits Medicaid and other public 
health plans from covering abortion services unless there is a threat to the pregnant woman’s 
life.130 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment in the 1980 case 
Harris v. McRae.131 McRae established abortion as a negative right in American law—the 
government has a duty not to prohibit access to abortion in certain circumstances, but it does not 
have an affirmative duty to assist a person in obtaining an abortion.132 Establishing abortion, as 
well as other reproductive rights, as a negative right was a critical blow to the reproductive rights 
movement, providing anti-abortion activists ample room to curb the scope of abortion and other 
reproductive rights.133 
Ironically, the case that solidified the constitutional right to an abortion, Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey,134 also provided anti-abortion activists with a framework for greatly 
limiting abortion rights.135 In Casey, the Court did away with both the strict scrutiny standard and 
the trimester framework from Roe, instead creating the “undue burden” standard136 and opening 
the door for modern state and federal laws restricting access to abortion.137 After Casey, a state 
could restrict and regulate abortions and abortion services as long as those restrictions did not 
                                                                  
in LIFE AND LEARNING IX 1, 10 (1999), available at http://www.uffl.org/vol%209/cassidy9.pdf (noting that the anti-
abortion movement grew during the 1960s and that arguments over the “nature and value of human life” have been a 
“major” element of American discourse since Roe). 
126 See Mary Ziegler, The Framing of a Right to Choose: Roe v. Wade and the Changing Debate on 
Abortion Law, 27 L. & HIST. REV. 281, 283–86, 321–23 (2009) (arguing that the decision in Roe changed the composition 
of interest groups that supported and opposed abortion rights in the United States). 
127 See David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective, 62 ALB. L. 
REV. 833, 842–43 (1999) (describing the early successes and failures of the anti-abortion movement post Roe). 
128 See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION LAWS 1 (Apr. 1, 
2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf. 
129 See Jeannie I. Rosoff, The Hyde Amendment and the Future, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 172, 172 (1980) 
(describing the passage and impact of the Hyde Amendment). 
130 See id. 
131 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
132 See Jenna MacNaughton, Comment, Positive Rights in Constitutional Law: No Need to Graft, Best Not to 
Prune, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 750, 750, 754-55 (2001) (defining negative rights and asserting that McRae established a 
negative constitutional right). 
133 See LSRJ PRIMER, supra note 69, at 12-13. 
134 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
135 David S. Meyer & Suzanne Staggenborg, Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political 
Opportunity, 101 AM. J. SOC. 1628, 1646 (1996) (describing the impact of Casey as encouraging states to pass 
“reasonable” abortion restrictions). 
136 Casey, 505 U.S. at 870, 876 (1992). 
137 LSRJ PRIMER, supra note 69, at 18. 
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create an “undue burden” or “substantial obstacle” to a woman’s access to services.138 However, 
the Casey Court preserved a woman’s right to abort a fetus before it became viable outside the 
womb.139 This ruling opened the doors for states to develop the targeted regulation of abortion 
provider (TRAP) laws that would become the fodder of modern reproductive rights debates.140 
Currently, the majority of states have at least one TRAP law,141 and three states have been so 
successful in restricting access that there is only one abortion provider remaining in each state.142 
The “pro-life” movement has accomplished a lot since Roe, as demonstrated by the near 
extinction of abortion providers in some states.143 Adopting pro-life policies has become a litmus 
test for modern conservative politicians, with radical pro-life policies becoming the norm of 
modern conservative politics.144 An increasing number of extreme social policies have been 
accepted in American politics since the early 1990s.145 The 2012 election, however, brought many 
of these extreme positions to light and started yet another national reaction against the 
radicalization of reproductive politics.146 Underlying some of these extreme views—particularly 
those of the radical Religious Right—is the definition of when life begins and the concept of 
                                                                  
138 Id. at 18-19. 
139 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
140 See Barry Yeoman, The Quiet War on Abortion, MOTHER JONES (Sept./Oct. 2001), available at http:// 
www.motherjones.com/politics/2001/09/quiet-war-abortion (describing how Casey set the foundation for future TRAP 
laws in the United States). 
141 See GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, supra note 128 (providing a chart of all abortion restrictive state laws in 
place as of Apr. 1, 2014). 
142 Dawn Johnsen, "Trap"ing Roe in Indiana and A Common-Ground Alternative, 118 YALE L.J. 1356, 1387 
(2009) (observing that Mississippi, North Dakota, and South Dakota have successfully used TRAP laws to close all but 
one abortion provider in each state). 
143 See id. 
144 See John Seery, Moral Perfectionism and Abortion Politics, 33 POLITY 345, 346, 349 (2001) (describing 
the use of abortion politics, particularly pro-life stances, as a political litmus test on moral values for social conservatives 
and the Religious Right).  
145 See Sal Gentile, As Furor Over Reproductive Rights Grows Louder, Number of States that are ‘Hostile’ 
to Abortion Doubles, Study Finds, THE DAILY NEED, PBS (Mar. 19, 2012, 12:05 PM), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-
know/the-daily-need/as-furor-over-reproductive-rights-grows-louder-number-of-states-that-are-hostile-to-abortion-
doubles-study-finds/13371/ (describing a recent Guttmacher Institute study that found a drastic increase in state anti-
abortion legislation and hostility between 2000 and 2012). 
146 See, e.g., Michael McAuliff, Richard Mourdock on Abortion: Pregnancy from Rape is ‘Something God 
Intended’, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 24, 2012, 9:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/23/richard-mourdock-
abortion_n_2007482.html. Extreme reproductive rights views, such as Senate candidate Richard Mourdock’s assertion that 
all abortion, including instances of rape, should be prohibited since “God intended [pregnancy] to happen”, were 
publicized during the 2012 election. Id. Other extreme, and often unscientific, views of reproductive rights were prevalent 
among conservative candidates in the 2012 election. Id. For example, Representative Todd Akin falsely asserted that 
women cannot be impregnated by “legitimate rape.” Id. Republican President hopeful Rick Santorum, a former Senator 
from Pennsylvania, took a strong stance against the availability of contraceptives during his 2012 campaign, arguing that 
states should be allowed to ban contraceptives. Ann Gerhart, Birth Control as Election Issue? Why?, WASH. POST (Feb. 
20, 2012), www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/birth-control-as-election-issue-why/2012/02/17/gIQASW6k 
PR_story.html. Most political candidates who expressed their extreme anti-abortion or anti-reproductive rights views lost 
their election bids in 2012, potentially indicating the beginning of another social shift in American politics away from the 
current religious extremism of social conservatives. See Most Candidates Who Made Controversial Abortion Remarks 
Defeated, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAM. (Nov. 07, 2012), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/ 
News2?abbr=daily2_&page=NewsArticle&id=36614. 
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embryonic “personhood.”147 
2.  Personhood: The New Battle Cry of the Radical Religious Right 
Personhood, the philosophical determination of when something acquires the status of 
being a full human person in society, “is not a matter of fact.”148 Instead, many argue that the 
moral status of person is conferred at some point during gestation, while the legal status of person 
is conferred after the birth of a child.149 Philosophers and theologians have debated the existence 
and importance of personhood for centuries.150 Religious groups, particularly modern Evangelical 
Christians and Catholics, use the personhood construct in addressing a number of reproductive 
issues.151 
The concept of fetal and embryonic personhood is relatively new to Christian 
theology,152 but has now become the cornerstone of the Evangelical Conservatives’ opposition to 
a number of reproductive rights.153 In the 1960s, at the height of the sexual revolution, 
contemporary Christian theology of personhood was consistent with the theology of medieval 
times: that “the soul [was] infused at some time after conception.”154 Thus, no “person” existed 
until the developing organism had been “infused” with a soul.155 This view has greatly changed in 
recent years, particularly in the abortion context.156 
The first shift in the Christian theological view of personhood to conception occurred in 
the nineteenth century Catholic Church.157 In 1875, following the discovery of fertilization of an 
                                                                  
147 See Seery, supra note 144, at 351, 354 (describing the moral framework many anti-choice candidates use 
to oppose abortion, which is almost exclusively based in Christian theology). 
148 Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition That ‘Life Begins at Conception’, 43 STAN. L. 
REV. 599, 601 (1991). 
149 See id.  
150 See DAVID ALBERT JONES, THE SOUL OF THE EMBRYO 220–35 (2004) (describing philosophical and 
Christian theological views of personhood). 
151 See Jonathan Dudley, My Take: When Evangelicals were Pro-Choice, CNN (Oct. 30, 2012, 5:54 PM), 
http://religion.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/30/my-take-when-evangelicals-were-pro-choice (describing the contradictions 
between historically held views which were tolerant of abortion and modern beliefs). 
152 See generally Gordon Dunstan, The Moral Status of the Human Embryo: A Tradition Recalled, 1 J. OF 
MED. ETHICS 38, 38 (1984) (arguing that claims for embryonic protection from conception were introduced in Western 
religious traditions at the end of the nineteenth century). 
153 See Dudley, supra note 151. 
154 JONES, supra note 150, at 220 (noting this view was consistent with medieval Christianity’s view on the 
beginning of life). 
155 See Valerie Tarico, Right-wing Christians Didn’t Always Hate Women, SALON (Nov. 17, 2012, 9:00 
AM), http://www.salon.com/2012/11/17/right_wing_christians_didnt_always_hate_women (noting that Christianity 
Today published an article in 1968 stating life did not begin until birth, and that the Bible drew a distinction between a 
fetus and an adult). 
156 Id. Interestingly, some biblical literalists adopted the new view that all life is sacred and that the Bible 
prohibits abortion after the language of the New American Standard Bible was altered to explicitly address the legal and 
moral status of a fetus. Id. The versions of the Bible published prior to 1995 treated the status of a fetus as different from 
that of a full human being. Id.  
157 John A. Balint, Ethical Issues in Stem Cell Research, 65 ALB. L. REV. 729, 735 (2002) (describing the 
evolution of Catholic views of when life begins). Prior to this decree, the Catholic Church believed that life began at 
“ensoulment,” which occurred at approximately 40 days gestation. Id. 
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ova by sperm, Pope Pius IX adopted the modern Catholic view that life begins at conception.158 
Every successive Pope has reaffirmed this view.159 Other Christian traditions have also adopted 
the belief that personhood begins at conception, including Missouri Synod Lutherans and some 
Southern Baptists.160 Contemporary Christian theologian Francis Beckwith has strongly argued 
that life begins at conception, and asserts that such a definition is strongly supported by Biblical 
text.161 Notably, though, other sects of Christianity and major religions like Judaism do not define 
life at conception.162 
Since the 1980s, the Religious Right in American politics has largely adopted the view 
that personhood begins at conception and has used this reasoning as a justification to oppose 
abortion, and in some cases, even contraception.163 This view has been taken to the extreme by 
some groups, such as the American Right to Life—which condemned 2008 Presidential nominee 
John McCain for endorsing rape exceptions in anti-abortion measures—who defines personhood 
at conception and believes that embryos should have full rights as persons.164 Such views have 
been behind a number of extreme state legislative initiatives to define life at, or even before, 
conception.165 Advancements in medical technologies have additionally led to the transfer of 
moral outrage from abortion and contraception to certain assisted reproductive technologies, such 
as in vitro fertilization and stem cell research.166 
3.  Scientific Advancement and Moral Outrage: Stem Cell Research 
Contemporaneously with the rise of the Religious Right and the shift to a personhood-
based opposition to reproductive issues like abortion, significant medical advancements since Roe 
have introduced a number of novel reproductive issues.167 A major point of contention for the 
Religious Right has been the acceptance of in vitro fertilization and the related issue of embryonic 
                                                                  
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Robert L. Maddox & Blaine Bortnick, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Do Legislative 
Declarations That Life Begins at Conception Violate the Establishment Clause?, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1989).  
161 Margaret D. Kamitsuka, Feminist Scholarship and Its Relevance for Political Engagement: The Test 
Case of Abortion in the U.S., 1 RELIGION & GEND. 18, 37 (2011). 
162 Balint, supra note 157, at 736. 
163 See Ari Armstrong & Diana Hsieh, The ‘Personhood’ Movement is Anti-Life: Why it Matters that Rights 
Begin at Birth, Not Conception, COAL. FOR SECULAR GOV’T, 3 (2010) (describing the Catholic Church’s opposition to 
contraceptives and noting that evangelical Protestants do not generally oppose contraceptives that work solely to prevent 
fertilization). 
164 Id. 
165 See Emily Wagster Pettus, Mississippi ‘Personhood’ Amendment Vote Fails, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 
2011, 11:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/08/mississippi-personhood-amendment_n_1082546.html 
(detailing the failed 2011 Mississippi state constitutional amendment that would have defined life at fertilization); John 
Celock, Arizona Abortion Bill: Legislators Pass Three Bills, Including One that Redefines When Life Begins, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Apr. 12, 2012, 4:56 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/10/az-abortion-bills-arizona-gestational-age_n_ 
1415715.html (describing an Arizona state bill that would define gestational age in terms of a woman’s last menstrual 
cycle, which could be as much as two weeks before conception). 
166 See infra Part I.D.3. 
167 See infra Part II.A. 
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stem cell research.168 The crux of the moral outrage in embryonic stem cell research, which many 
hope will find cures to debilitating diseases such as Parkinson’s and ALS,169 is that the embryo 
would be destroyed through the research process.170 Embryonic personhood advocates have made 
several attempts to stop embryonic stem cell research and federal funding for such research based 
entirely on the belief that the research destroys lives.171 
During President George W. Bush’s administration, advocates for embryonic personhood 
found a strong ally.172 President Bush was a member of the personhood movement of the 
Religious Right, and helped advance the personhood agenda through his 2005 announcement 
supporting embryo adoption over donation to embryonic stem cell research.173 During the late 
1990s and early 2000s, the promise of medical cures for previously incurable diseases persuaded 
many Americans, including some ardent pro-life adherents, to support embryonic stem cell 
research.174 President Bush’s reframing of the issue, asserting the personhood of unused embryos 
from in vitro fertilization, revitalized the movement against stem cell research. The resulting 
Bush-era policies greatly restricted funding for embryonic stem cell research, and prompted states 
like Maryland to create its own solution to the federal limitations on embryonic stem cell 
research.175 
The election of Barack Obama in 2008 greatly changed the discourse surrounding 
embryonic stem cell research and personhood issues as a whole. Only months into office, 
President Obama rescinded President Bush’s executive order restricting funding for embryonic 
stem cell research.176 Additionally, the personhood arguments of the Religious Right have fallen 
outside the mainstream understanding of many Americans; and emerging concepts such as the 
parental rights of single persons and same-sex couples, as well as the general acceptance of 
assisted reproductive technology make it highly unlikely that the personhood purity standards of 
the Right to Life movement will be adopted by mainstream American culture.177 
                                                                  
168 See James J. McCartney, Embryonic Stem Cell Research and Respect for Human Life: Philosophical and 
Legal Reflections, 65 ALB. L. REV. 597, 613 n.85, 614 (2002) (describing various ethical arguments related to embryonic 
stem cell research, including the moral status of the developing embryo). 
169 See Sonja Kriks, et al., Dopamine Neurons Derived from Human ES Cells Efficiently Engraft in Animal 
Models of Parkinson’s Disease, 480 NATURE 547, 551 (2011) (concluding based on animal studies that continued 
embryonic stem cell research could lead to a cell based therapy for Parkinson’s disease). Advocacy groups for other 
degenerative diseases, such as Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, or ALS, also support the use of embryonic stem cell research 
to find a cure. See generally LUCIE BRUIJN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, ALS ASS’N, A 
PRIMER ON STEM CELLS, available at www.alsa.org/research/about-als-research/primer-on-stem-cells.html.  
170 See McCartney, supra note 168, at 612-15. 
171 See Lisa Shaw Roy, Roe and the New Frontier, 27 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 339, 368 (2003) 
(discussing the link between embryo disputes and embryonic stem cell research, including the controversy over federally 
funded stem cell research); Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2011), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 2938 (2011) (denying 
standing to cryogenically preserved embryos in suit brought on the embryos’ behalf, alleging a violation of the embryos’ 
constitutional and statutory rights). 
172 See supra Introduction. 
173 See Janet L. Dolgin, New Terms for an Old Debate: Embryos, Dying, and the ‘Culture Wars’, 6 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 249, 268 (2006). 
174 Id. at 249, 268. 
175 See supra Introduction. 
176 Exec. Order No.13,505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10,667 (Mar. 09, 2009). 
177 See infra Part II; see also Conover, supra note 115, at 642. 
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II.  THE “NEW NORMAL” OF AMERICAN FAMILIES: DEVELOPMENT AND 
ACCEPTANCE OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND AMERICAN LAW 
Scientific and medical advancements over the past few decades have greatly increased 
the reproductive options available to American families.178 There are now numerous options to 
overcome almost any barrier to reproduction, including the absence of a sexual partner.179 
American laws have slowly adapted to these new American families, but there are still a number 
of gaps in the legal framework surrounding assisted reproductive technology.180 This section first 
provides a brief overview of assisted reproductive technology.181 It then describes several aspects 
of American law affected by assisted reproductive technology—specifically, defining the parent-
child relationship.182 Finally, this section analyzes the implications embryonic personhood has on 
ARTs and the modern American family.183 
A.  A Brief History of Assisted Reproductive Technology Development 
Assisted reproductive technology is a general term for non-coital, or third party, 
reproduction.184 The first recorded human conception through ART occurred in the late eighteenth 
century, when Dr. John Hunter helped a husband and wife achieve pregnancy using artificial 
insemination (AI).185 It was not until 1884 that donor sperm was used to achieve a pregnancy in 
the United States.186  For many decades, AI was the only form of non-coital reproductive 
technology available. It was not until the 1960s that medical researchers began trying to use other 
types of ART.187 
Processes like in vitro fertilization were considered a scientific fantasy for a long time.188 
                                                                  
178 See infra Part II.A. 
179 See infra Part II.A. 
180 See infra Part II.B. 
181 See infra Part II.A. 
182 See infra Part II.B. 
183 See infra Part II.C. 
184 While the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define ART as limited to those procedures in 
which both the sperm and egg are handled, this Article will use a more expansive definition that encompasses all methods 
of reproduction other than coitus. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY (ART), www.cdc.gov/art (last updated Nov. 2013). 
185 Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial 
Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1049-50 (2002). Notably, the physician was not present for the insemination; 
instead, he provided the husband instructions and then left the couple to complete the task. Id. 
186 R. SNOWDEN & G.D. MITCHELL, THE ARTIFICIAL FAMILY 13 (1981) (describing the 1909 announcement 
in the journal Medical World that “the first human donor insemination had been performed at Jefferson Medical College, 
in America, in 1884”). With the advent of genetic testing, donor sperm is often tested for markers of certain genetic 
disorders that may cause the donor to be excluded from selection. See STRONG, supra note 22, at 153-54 (describing 
guidelines that could permit the exclusion of donors with hereditary conditions such as sickle-cell anemia and Tay-Sachs 
disease). 
187 See R. G. Edwards, IVF and the History of Stem Cells, 413 NATURE 349, 349 (2001); see also Gerardo 
Vela et al., Advances and Controversies In Assisted Reproductive Technology, 76 MT. SINAI J. MED. 506, 507 (2009) 
(noting that the first reported live birth from IVF occurred in 1978). 
188 Moon H. Kim, Current Trends in Human IVF and Other Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 31 YONSEI 
MED. J. 91, 91 (1990). 
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IVF begins with the harvest of a mature human egg cell from a woman shortly before she 
ovulates.189 The egg is then fertilized with sperm in a petri dish, and the resulting fertilized egg 
begins to divide.190 Once the fertilized egg divides, it becomes an embryo that can be transferred 
to a human uterus for gestation, used for research purposes, or cryogenically preserved for future 
use.191 
In 1978, Louise Brown became the first human child conceived through IVF and 
resulting in a live birth.192 Shortly thereafter, in 1984, the first birth from a cryogenically frozen 
embryo occurred.193 Since then, IVF has become very successful in the United States.194 These 
procedures have become so popular that more than one percent of all births per year in the United 
States are conceived via IVF.195 
In addition to IVF’s popularity, the method has become more refined and effective over 
the years, with success rates increasing in recent years.196 Recently, the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) published an article indicating that success rates for embryo 
transfers have become so high that, in certain circumstances, transferring only one embryo is 
sufficient.197 Until the late 1990s, when the ASRM revised its practice guidelines, it was a 
common practice for multiple embryos to be transferred in order to compensate for failed 
implantation attempts.198 With the rise of IVF and the improved technology of cryogenically 
freezing and storing embryos, cryopreservation has become a common practice and the surplus of 
stored embryos is increasing.199 
Advances in reproductive medicine, however, come with social and financial costs.200 
                                                                  
189 BONNIE STEINBOCK, LIFE BEFORE BIRTH: THE MORAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF EMBRYOS & FETUSES 
200-01 (1992).  
190 Id. at 200-01. The term in vitro literally means “in glass,” referring to the use of a glass petri dish to 
fertilize the two gametes.  
191 Id. 
192 Margie Mietling Eget, Casenote, The Solomon Decision: A Study of Davis v. Davis, 42 MERCER L. REV. 
1113, 1114 (1991).  
193 Id. at 1115. 
194 James P. Toner, Progress We Can Be Proud Of: U.S. Trends in Assisted Reproduction Over the First 
Twenty Years, 78 FERTILITY & STERILITY 943, 948–49 (2002) (noting the success of IVF procedures in the United States 
from 1985 through 2000). 
195 What is Assisted Reproductive Technology?, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http:// 
www.cdc.gov/art (last updated Feb. 21, 2014). 
196 Toner, supra note 194, at 948-49. In the past, multiple embryos were transferred in hopes of increasing 
the chance for implantation and pregnancy. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Elective Single-Embryo Transfer, 97 FERTILITY 
& STERILITY 835, 835 (2012). Now that the technology has improved, single-embryo transfer is being advocated for some 
patients in order to reduce the chance of a multiple pregnancy, which is a higher risk pregnancy. Id. 
197 See Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 196, at 835, 837 (asserting that with the increased success 
of IVF transfers, for women under the age of 35 with more than one high quality embryo for transfer, a single embryo 
transfer is appropriate). 
198 Id. at 835. 
199 Brandon J. Bankowski et al., The Social Implications of Embryo Cryopreservation, 84 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 823, 823 (2005). 
200 François Olivennes & René Frydman, Friendly IVF: The Way of the Future?, 13 HUMAN REPROD. 1121, 
1121–22 (1998) (discussing the cost of IVF). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol17/iss3/3
17.3_DAVIS_MARYLAND EMBRYO ADOPTION_FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/14  12:06 AM 
2014] MARYLAND “EMBRYO ADOPTION” 311 
Couples must decide the fate of unused embryonic material.201 Nationally, the disposition of 
unused embryos has sparked social outcries at the rise of IVF and the destruction of unused 
embryos.202 Despite social discomfort about the IVF industry, business is booming.203 Much of 
this boom comes from the lack of government regulation of the infertility market.204 Even with a 
competitive market and some private insurers covering the costs of IVF, treatment remains 
expensive.205 In 2009, the average cost of one standard IVF cycle in the United States was 
$12,513.206 Cryogenically storing embryos is also an expensive endeavor.207 Despite its increased 
use and acceptance as a method of reproduction, IVF remains an expensive choice for couples.208 
At any given time, as many as twenty percent of American couples experience 
infertility.209 While many couples ultimately use ARTs to achieve a pregnancy,210 it is usually a 
deeply private experience that involves numerous emotional conflicts and difficult choices.211 
Since reproduction is usually a private experience, the legal implications of using ARTs are rarely 
considered before the technology is developed and widely implemented.212 
                                                                  
201 See Alison Lobron, The Maybe-Baby Dilemma, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Nov. 22, 2009 (describing a 
couple’s struggle in deciding what to do with remaining frozen embryos after they feel their family is complete). 
202 See Conde, supra note 2, at 283-86 (examining the rhetoric surrounding “snowflake babies” and 
discussing organizations that view the destruction of any embryos as a destruction of human life and therefore promote the 
“adoption” of cryogenically preserved embryos). 
203 See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE 
COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 3 (2006) (“In 2004, more than one million Americans underwent some form of fertility 
treatment, participating in what had become a nearly $3 billon industry.”). 
204 See Tarun Jain et al., Trends in Embryo-Transfer Practice and in Outcomes of the Use of Assisted 
Reproductive Technology in the United States, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1639, 1640 (2004) (attributing the lack of 
regulation of the U.S. infertility market to the belief that fertility decisions should remain between a physician and their 
patient). 
205 Some states, including Maryland, mandate that private insurers cover certain IVF treatments. See, e.g., 
MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15–810 (LexisNexis 2011); see also Katherine E. Abel, Note, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
and Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment: An Inconceivable Union, 37 CONN. L. REV. 819, 823 (2005).  
206 Desireé M. McCarthy-Keith et al., Will Decreasing Assisted Reproduction Technology Costs Improve 
Utilization and Outcomes Among Minority Women?, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2587, 2587 (2010).  
207 See, e.g., Single Cycle IVF Cost Details, ADVANCED FERTILITY CTR. OF CHI., http://www.advanced 
fertility.com/ivfprice.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2014) (showing a cost of $750 for embryos to be cryogenically frozen and 
stored for one year, with a cost of $600 for each subsequent year).  
208 See McCarthy-Keith et al., supra note 206, at 2587 (describing the financial barriers to accessing IVF in 
the United States for low-income and uninsured women).  
209 Steven H. Snyder, I’m a Divorce Lawyer! So Why Should I Read About ART?, 34 FAM. ADVOCATE 6, 6 
(2011).  
210 Compare id. (stating that a “vast number” of infertile persons in the United States choose various medical 
procedures to treat infertility and “often participat[e] in third-party reproduction”), with Arthur L. Greil et al., Infertility 
Treatment and Fertility-Specific Distress: A Longitudinal Analysis of a Population-Based Sample of U.S. Women, 73 SOC. 
SCI. & MED. 87, 88 (2011) (asserting that fewer than fifty percent of infertile U.S. women participate in medical 
procedures to treat infertility). 
211 Snyder, supra note 209, at 7 (describing the deep sense of privacy some couples feel toward using ARTs, 
with one couple concealing their use of an egg donor from their friends and family). 
212 See Anna Stolley Persky, Reproductive Technology and the Law, WASHINGTON LAWYER, Jul./Aug. 
2012, at 23–24 (describing the political implications of ARTs, including conflicting state laws). 
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B.  Adapting Existing Laws for Families Achieved through Assisted Reproductive Technology 
The law has been very slow to accommodate the changing family dynamics that arise 
from the use of ARTs.213 Some ARTs, like AI, fit comfortably within existing parentage laws.214 
Others, like IVF, are much more complicated and often involve novel legal issues.215 There is no 
national policy addressing ARTs; instead, the states have been free to draft their own laws 
regarding ARTs.216 Despite the lack of legal consistency surrounding ARTs—with some forms of 
assisted reproduction criminalized in certain jurisdictions217—many forms of ARTs have become 
widely accepted in American culture.218 
1.  The Marital Presumption: Incorporating the use of ARTs into Existing Family  
and Inheritance Laws 
Artificial insemination, when used within a marriage, is the least problematic form of 
ART to incorporate into the existing legal framework. Under the common law, a child born 
during a marriage is presumed to be the legal child of the husband and wife.219 This is a rebuttable 
presumption that historically could only be overcome with strong evidence that the father was 
either sterile or not near the wife during the time of conception.220 Genetic testing provides one 
means of overcoming the marital presumption.221 When using AI, however, the husband is only 
                                                                  
213 Id. at 28 (describing the troubles encountered by determining legal parentage under an antiquated 
understanding of pregnancy and birth, into which many ARTs do not fit). 
214 Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach 
to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 623–24 (2002) (describing the marital presumption for parentage of a child 
conceived via artificial insemination). 
215 See generally ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 87–92 (1995) (discussing controversies and ethical dilemmas related to IVF). 
216 The assisted reproductive technology market is largely self-regulated. See SPAR, supra note 203, at 5. 
Some states, however, have enacted laws directly governing certain aspects of third-party reproduction. See, e.g., LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 14:101.2 (2013) (prohibiting the implantation of an IVF embryo without the express written consent of both 
progenitor and recipient); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168–B:13 (2013) (creating statutory guidelines for proper IVF consent 
procedures). Disposition of cryogenically preserved embryos in the event of divorce, death or abandonment, however, is 
rarely addressed in the law. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.17 (2013) (mandating that couples pursuing IVF enter a written 
agreement regarding the disposition of embryos related by the union). 
217 Surrogacy, where a woman carries a child for another intended couple or individual, has been 
criminalized in several states. See, e.g. D.C. CODE § 16-402 (2013) (prohibiting surrogacy contracts in the District of 
Columbia and creating a civil penalty up to $10,000 or one year imprisonment, or both); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 
(2013) (prohibiting the formation of a surrogacy contract and declaring the surrogate mother the legal mother of any child 
resulting from such a contract); but see Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding 
Arizona statute prohibiting surrogacy was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds).  
218 To provide one example from popular culture, NBC television premiered the sitcom The New Normal in 
2012, which revolves around a gay couple hiring a surrogate to carry their child. GLAAD, The New Normal (last visited 
February 18, 2014), http://www.glaad.org/thenewnormal. It is one of several television shows that have positively shown 
the use of ARTs to help create non-traditional families. Id.  
219 Jana Singer, Marriage, Biology, and Paternity: The Case for Revitalizing the Marital Presumption, 65 
MD. L. REV. 246, 248 (2006). 
220 Id. 
221 See Erin V. Podolny, Are You My Mother?: Removing A Gestational Surrogate’s Name from the Birth 
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determined to be the legal father of the child if he consented to the insemination.222 Many 
jurisdictions require this consent to be in writing, and it is often not presumed.223 
Even with genetic testing, it can be difficult to overcome the marital presumption of 
paternity.224 A genetic father may not have judicial standing to bring a paternity claim if the child 
has been born into another marriage.225 In these situations, if the husband accepts the child and 
holds the child out as his own, it is unlikely that a court will grant the genetic father standing to 
challenge the marital presumption of paternity.226 
Regardless of the marital status of the mother that conceives a child using AI, the sperm 
donor is generally protected against legal fatherhood.227 Specifically, when sperm is anonymously 
donated the donor is protected against claims for paternity.228 When the sperm donor is known, 
however, the parental status may be less clear under the common law.229 If a known donor enters 
into a contract that provides for a lack of parental rights with the intended single mother, he is 
unlikely to be adjudicated the legal father of any resulting child.230 The Uniform Parentage Act 
(UPA) declares, “A donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted 
reproduction.”231 Several states have adopted the UPA, but the sections referring to donor 
materials and AI vary widely.232 
                                                                  
Certificate in the Name of Equal Protection, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 351, 359 (2008) 
(explaining that in Maryland, the right to a blood test to challenge the establishment of paternity is the “right of a putative 
father for relief from potentially false paternity determinations”). 
222 Storrow, supra note 214, at 623-24; see also Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the 
Paternal Obligations Between the Men Involved in the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 
958 (2009) (noting that, in most jurisdictions, if the husband does not consent to the insemination he will not be held 
financially responsible for the resultant child).  
223 Storrow, supra note 214, at 623-24. 
224 See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (holding that the genetic father of a child born 
into an intact marriage had no constitutional due process right to establish his paternity of the child). 
225 Id. at 120.  
226 Id. at 127. 
227 See, e.g., Daryl L. Gordon-Ceresky, Note, Artificial Insemination: Its Effect on Paternity and Inheritance 
Rights, 9 CONN. PROB. L.J. 245, 261–62 (1995) (noting that New Jersey and California do not recognize the parental rights 
of sperm donors). 
228 See id. 
229 See id. 
230 See, e.g., Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236, 1248 (Pa. 2007) (holding that a known sperm donor 
was not the legal father of a child, having no financial or legal obligations to the child, because he donated sperm under an 
agreement that declared him to not be the legal father of the child). 
231 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002). 
232 Harvey L. Fiser & Paula K. Garrett, It Takes Three, Baby: The Lack of Standard, Legal Definitions of 
"Best Interest of the Child" and the Right to Contract for Lesbian Potential Parents, 15 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1, 10 
(2008) (“Although between nineteen and twenty-one states have attempted to pass legislation based on the UPA, most 
other states have little, if any, guidance on the rights of persons participating in AI. Further, most of the states adopting 
some version of the UPA have significantly varying provisions, which makes the act far from ‘uniform.’”). 
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2.  Establishing Parentage Outside of Marriage: Uncertainty for Single Parents  
and Same-Sex Couples 
Establishing the parentage of a child born outside the institution of marriage is 
considerably more difficult.233 Lesbians, and women generally, have fewer barriers to procreation 
than gay couples or single men as many women likely have the ability to gestate a pregnancy 
themselves.234 Men who wish to become parents but who are not in a sexual relationship with a 
woman are limited to either adopting a child or hiring a surrogate mother.235 Although the medical 
technology exists for single individuals and gay couples to procreate, it is often costly and the 
legal parentage of the resulting children is not firmly established.236 
A single parent wishing to establish sole legal parentage can encounter several legal 
obstacles.237 It is easier for a single woman to establish sole legal parentage of a child than for a 
man to do so.238 Single mothers often can avoid an establishment of paternity by not listing a 
father on the child’s birth certificate.239 This is particularly true when a single woman uses donor 
sperm to achieve pregnancy.240 It is far more difficult for a man to gain sole parentage because the 
gestational mother of a child is often considered the legal mother of that child at birth.241  Some 
states allow pre-birth orders to determine the legal parentage of a child born to a gestational 
surrogate,242 but only Maryland has considered, and permitted, a child born without a mother 
                                                                  
233 See generally SUSAN L. CROCKIN & HOWARD W. JONES, LEGAL CONCEPTIONS: THE EVOLVING LAW 
AND POLICY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 211-16 (2010) (discussing legal parentage cases and issues 
when children are conceived via ARTs). 
234 See Mary B. Mahowald, As If There Were Fetuses Without Women: A Remedial Essay, in 
REPRODUCTION, ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 199, 217 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995) (describing the 
use of self-insemination by women to become pregnant outside of a sexual relationship with men).  
235 See Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 149 (2000) (describing 
procreative limitations of gays and lesbians); Barbara J. Berg, Listening to the Voices of the Infertile, in REPRODUCTION, 
ETHICS, AND THE LAW: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 104, 104 (Joan C. Callahan ed., 1995) (describing how “single or 
homosexual individuals” rarely discover infertility due to their inherent need to use ARTs to procreate). 
236 See generally CROCKIN & JONES, supra note 233 (discussing legal parentage cases and issues when 
children are conceived via ARTs). 
237 Jeffrey A. Parness, New Federal Paternity Laws: Securing More Fathers at Birth for the Children of 
Unwed Mothers, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 59, 60 (2006) (asserting that U.S. public policy supports the establishment of legal 
motherhood and fatherhood at birth). 
238 At common law, the father of a non-marital child had no rights to prevent the child’s adoption. Garrison, 
supra note 233, at 885. The only legal parent of these non-marital children was the mother, who by default was the woman 
who had given birth to the child. Id.  
239 See Jeffrey A. Parness, Systematically Screwing Dads: Out of Control Paternity Schemes, 54 WAYNE L. 
REV. 641, 655 (2008) (describing the system of voluntary paternity acknowledgement in the United States).  
240 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2002). 
241 See, e.g., In re Roberto, 923 A.2d 115, 131-32 (Md. 2007) (permitting a single father to have the 
gestational surrogate’s name removed from the birth certificate because she was not genetically related and had entered 
into the surrogacy contract under the agreement that she would have no legal obligation to the child); see also Amy M. 
Larkey, Note, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE 
L. REV. 605, 619-20 (2003) (observing that birth mothers are generally considered to be the legal mother of the child, and 
must affirmatively give up those rights). 
242 Mary P. Byrn & Steven H. Snyder, The Use of Prebirth Parentage Orders in Surrogacy Proceedings, 39 
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listed on the birth certificate.243 
Same-sex couples also encounter legal barriers to having both parents listed on a child’s 
birth certificate.244 In some jurisdictions, a pre-birth order can grant both parents legal parental 
status at birth—regardless of sexual orientation.245 In jurisdictions where a pre-birth order is not 
possible, many same-sex couples must use a second parent adoption proceeding in order for both 
parents to be recognized as legal parents of the child.246 In either scenario, though, the couple is 
left to the mercy of the judge and the judicial system.247 Until recently, some states prohibited 
adoption by gay and lesbian couples by statute,248 and even now some states do not recognize 
second parent adoption as a means of granting full legal parental rights to same-sex parents.249 
Despite the barriers same-sex couples and single persons have to building families 
through ARTs, the practice is generally accepted in popular culture,250 and has a growing 
acceptance in American society. With the acceptance of ART families in general society, the 
establishment of embryonic personhood would have a profound chilling effect on the industry.251 
Recognition of embryonic personhood would also deny many Americans the ability and right to 
create a family.252 
                                                                  
FAM. L.Q.  633, 634-35 (2005). 
243 See In re Roberto, 923 A.2d at 132 (holding that a biological father could remove the surrogate mother’s 
information from the birth certificate).  
244 A same-sex couple must go through the legal system to have both parents listed in the birth certificate. 
CHRISTINE M. DURKIN & ANGELA M. ORDOÑEZ, NAMING NONMARITAL CHILDREN: BIRTH CERTIFICATES AND NAME 
CHANGE PETITIONS § 10-3 (2009). Such couples may either have a court adjudicate parentage or complete a second parent 
adoption of the child. Id.  
245 See, e.g., Davis v. Kania, 836 A.2d 480, 484 (Conn. Super. 2003) (recognizing and enforcing a California 
pre-birth order that declared both members of a gay couple to be the legal parents of a child carried by a gestational 
surrogate). 
246 Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of 
Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 205 (2009) (describing the use of second parent 
adoption by gay and lesbian parents). 
247 See Sheryl L. Sultan, The Right of Homosexuals to Adopt: Changing Legal Interpretations of ‘Parent’ 
and ‘Family’, 10 J. SUFFOLK ACAD. L. 45, 77 (1995) (describing the discretion courts have in adoption proceedings, 
including consideration of a party’s sexual orientation). It is likely that this notion is changing, albeit slowly, as more legal 
protections are afforded to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered persons. See Douglas NeJaime, The Legal 
Mobilization Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663, 681 (2012) (describing political and legal strides made by the LGBT 
community for marriage equality, anti-discrimination protection, and expanded access to legal parentage). 
248 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.042 (2003) (“No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that 
person is a homosexual.”). This statute was valid until 2010, when the Florida District Court of Appeal found it 
unconstitutional because there was no rational basis for prohibiting homosexuals from adopting children when state law 
permitted homosexual couples to care for the same children in foster care. Florida Dept. of Children & Families v. 
Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So.3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
249 See, e.g., MISS. CODE. ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (2012) (denying same sex couples access to a second parent 
adoption). 
250 See The New Normal, supra note 218. 
251 See infra Part II.C. 
252 See infra Part II.C. 
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C.  Establishing Embryonic Personhood Would have a Chilling Effect on the ART Industry and 
Deny Many Americans the Ability to Create a Family 
The heart of the modern ART industry is IVF, which has greatly expanded the 
procreative options available to infertile persons.253 Since the development of IVF in the late 
1970s, its practice has grown greatly and there has been a great increase in the number of embryos 
cryogenically stored in the United States.254 Some estimate that the United States has between 
400,000 and 500,000 cryogenically preserved embryos.255 Despite the fact that these embryos 
were fertilized outside the womb, coming to existence in a method not dreamed of until the 
twentieth century, many in the Religious Right believe that these embryos have a personhood 
status.256 
Holding an embryo to be a full legal person raises numerous ethical and legal issues.257 
For instance, if an embryo has full personhood, it would be both immoral and criminal to thaw, or 
‘kill’, it.258 Logically, if an embryo is considered a legal person, the destruction of the embryo in 
any manner is tantamount to murder.259 Only one state, Louisiana, has legally imposed a pseudo-
personhood status on in vitro embryos.260 Based on the wording of the law, once an in vitro 
embryo is implanted into a uterus it would again lose its personhood status.261 
Creating a legal personhood status for embryos could have a chilling effect on the IVF 
industry, as industry workers may become reluctant to perform procedures for fear of civil or 
criminal liability if the embryos were harmed, accidentally or otherwise.262 Although IVF would 
not be per se criminal if a legal status of personhood is adopted, the procedure would likely 
become less effective and more dangerous.263 For instance, the adoption of legal personhood may 
                                                                  
253 See SPAR, supra note 203, at 3 (displaying table showing that, in 2004, revenue from IVF procedures 
constituted nearly one-third of the American infertility market). 
254 Jennifer Baker, A War of Words: How Fundamentalist Rhetoric Threatens Reproductive Autonomy, 43 
U.S.F. L. REV. 671, 685 (2009) (describing the “exploding frozen embryo population”). 
255 Id. 
256 See id. (noting that those in favor of embryo adoption believe that life begins a conception). 
257 John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 444-50 
(1990) (describing competing moral frameworks surrounding early stage embryos, particularly the religious view of life 
beginning at conception). 
258 Id. at 444. 
259 Stephanie J. Owen, Note, Davis v. Davis: Establishing Guidelines for Resolving Disputes Over Frozen 
Embryos, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 493, 497-98 (1993) (“The legal ramifications of person status for abortion 
and IVF are clear: any procedure allowing or causing the destruction of an embryo is an unacceptable violation of the 
embryo's liberty, and may be considered murder.”). 
260 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:125 (1986) (“An in vitro fertilized human ovum as a juridical person is 
recognized as a separate entity apart from the medical facility or clinic where it is housed or stored.”) (emphasis added). 
261 Emilie W. Clemmens, Creating Human Embryos for Research: A Scientist's Perspective on Managing 
the Legal and Ethical Issues, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 95, 101 (2005). 
262 See RESOLVE’s Policy on ‘Personhood’ Legislation, RESOLVE (Apr. 2012), http:// 
www.resolve.org/about/personhood-legislation.html. RESOLVE is a national infertility association that opposes 
Personhood Legislation because such legislation would likely limit the IVF industry. Id. 
263 See Michelle Goldberg, Will Mississippi Ban IVF?, THE DAILY BEAST (Oct. 24, 2011), http:// 
www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/10/24/personhood-ballot-initiative-in-mississippi-could-ban-some-ivf-practices.html 
(interviewing Mississippi IVF physician Dr. Randall Hines about the implication of the Mississippi Personhood 
Constitutional Amendment proposal on IVF treatments in the state). 
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prevent practitioners from developing more than one embryo for implantation at a time.264 
Limiting the number of embryos created in each round severely limits the success of IVF, as not 
all embryos created in vitro are viable for uterine transfer.265 This lack of implantation success 
will likely increase the total number of IVF cycles completed, thereby increasing the risk of major 
health complications such as future development of ovarian cancer.266 Additionally, multiple IVF 
attempts become cost prohibitive for many and would reduce the overall number of IVF attempts 
made.267 The cumulative effect of declaring an embryo a legal person would therefore limit the 
procreative options available to many Americans who do not otherwise have the capacity to 
procreate. 
The personhood debates currently taking place in the United States have made one thing 
clear: there is no consensus on the legal or moral status of embryos or fetuses. Lack of consensus 
makes legislation on these issues “problematical” for many, and necessitates approaching 
legislation with caution.268 As noted in a case before the High Court of Australia, “‘[t]here are 
limits to the extent to which the law should intrude upon personal liberty and personal privacy in 
the pursuit of moral and religious aims.’”269 This balance between personal privacy, personal 
liberty, and religiously motivated moral goals has an even greater protection in American law.270 
III.  PERSON, THING, OR SOMETHING ELSE? WHY THE TERMINOLOGY MATTERS 
The underlying contention behind the Religious Right’s “pro-life” stance in matters of 
abortion, contraception, and stem cell research is that full moral and legal personhood begins at 
conception.271 As described above, the definition of personhood has great moral and legal 
implications within the reproductive rights framework.272 In the decades since the introduction of 
IVF, scholars have struggled to define the exact moral and legal status of an embryo.273 Because 
                                                                  
264 See id. (noting that some who favor personhood believe physicians should not develop multiple embryos, 
as the selection of viable embryos is akin to “looking at the ones you [the physician or parents] want to give life to and 
destroying the rest”). 
265 See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A 
LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 94 (2d ed., 2011) (noting that multiple eggs are fertilized in each 
round of IVF as not every implantation results in pregnancy). If a patient does not create and store extra embryos or 
gametes during the IVF cycle, additional rounds may be required if no children result or if more children are wanted. See 
id. 
266 See Diane Beeson & Abby Lippman, Egg Harvesting for Stem Cell Research: Medical Risks and Ethical 
Problems, 13 REPROD. BIOMED. ONLINE 573, 574 (2006) (describing the long-term health risks of ovarian stimulation—
used to collect ova for IVF procedures—including links to future incidences of ovarian cancer); see also Developments in 
the Law: Medical Technology and the Law, HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1540-41 (1990) (stating the long-term health 
consequences of the drugs used during IVF are unknown). 
267 See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text. 
268 Mark W. Richardson, Can the Use of Human Embryos for Research Be Banned or Would that Be 
Unconstitutional in Australia?, in THE REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 231, 232 (Jennifer 
Gunning & Helen Szoke eds., 2003) (describing ethical concerns surrounding embryonic personhood in Australian 
legislation). 
269 Id. at 242–43 (quoting Att’y General ex rel Kerr v. T, 46 A.L.R. 275, 277-78 (1983)). 
270 See infra Part III–IV. 
271 See supra Parts I.D.2, II.C. 
272 See supra Parts I.D.2, II.C. 
273 See Barbara Gregoratos, Note, Tempest in the Laboratory: Medical Research on Spare Embryos from In 
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the legal status of embryos is not uniformly defined and varies by jurisdiction,274 clear 
terminology is essential in discussing the status of an embryo for the purposes of stem cell 
research and related issues like abortion. 
Under the “pro-life” framework supported by the political Religious Right, all embryos 
obtain personhood status at the moment of conception.275 In stark contrast to the pro-life stance is 
the view that embryos are merely property and do not hold any special status, morally or 
legally.276 Somewhere between these two views lies the least controversial embryo status: a 
balance of property and personhood.277 This middle status, which treats embryos as a special form 
of property due to its potentiality for life, has been the foundation of embryo disposition disputes 
in state courts.278 
Since few states clearly define an embryo’s legal status, determining a state’s view on an 
embryo’s status comes from an assessment of the state’s statutory and case law addressing 
embryos. First, this section argues that embryo donation confers a property or quasi-property 
status to embryos while embryo adoption confers a personhood status to embryos.279 Second, this 
section argues that embryo adoption is a purely religious construct in American politics.280 
A.  Defining the Terms 
Many providers use the terms embryo donation and embryo adoption interchangeably.281 
The terms, however, confer fundamentally different understandings of an embryo’s moral and 
legal status. At their core, both terms convey the same actions between the progenitors282 and the 
receivers283 of an embryo. The progenitors, after either completing their family through IVF or 
reaching an impasse in using the excess embryos,284 decide to give their remaining embryos to 
                                                                  
Vitro Fertilization, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 977, 987–90 (1986) (describing the legal status of an embryo in different areas of the 
law). 
274 See Clemmens, supra note 261, at 100–02 (outlining the varying state laws that apply to embryos, 
particularly in the realm of stem cell research). 
275 Balint supra note 157, at 734-35. 
276 See Karin A. Moore, Embryo Adoption: The Legal and Moral Challenges, 1 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 100, 114 (2007) (describing a consent agreement that described embryos as property to be divided in divorce). 
277 Clemmens, supra note 261, at 100. 
278 Id. 
279 See infra Part III.A. 
280 See infra Part III.B. 
281 Conde, supra note 2, at 280. 
282 Progenitors of an embryo in this case are the individual(s) that initially contracted with a clinic to create 
the embryo and do not necessarily have a genetic link to the embryo. Traditionally, the progenitors would be a husband 
and wife who both contributed the gametes that made the embryo in question, but the introduction of donor sperm and egg 
cells makes this assumption faulty. The progenitors could be a same-sex or heterosexual couple or a single person who has 
acquired donor gamete(s) through other transactions. See supra Part II.A–B.  
283 Here, the receivers of an embryo are the individuals to whom the progenitors gave an embryo. 
284 See Lobron, supra note 201; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003) 
(holding that the parties’ disposition agreement to discard the cryogenically preserved embryos was unenforceable because 
one party had changed their mind, and that any storage costs would be borne by the party who opposed discarding of the 
embryos); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001) (declining to enforce a contract between the parties to donate the 
remaining embryos to another couple in the event of divorce); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (enforcing the 
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another individual or couple for the purposes of procreation.285 
The notable difference between the actions taken in embryo donation and embryo 
adoption is the ease with which the recipients acquire the embryos. Recipients of donated 
embryos may be required to provide basic demographic information such as marital status and 
income level to a progenitor deciding who will receive any excess embryos.286 Recipients of 
adopted embryos, however, are subjected to the same screening standards as traditional child 
adoption—including meetings with social workers, background checks, and mandatory parenting 
education.287 
In embryo donation, the status of the embryo is consistent with current state laws, most 
of which view embryos as property with a special status due to its procreative potential.288 The 
transfer between progenitor and recipient is governed purely by contract, and often the donors 
only rely on the basic health and demographic information of the recipients to decide which 
recipients are given embryos.289 Based on the agreement between progenitors and recipients, the 
donation can be done with as much or little communication between them as desired,290 but 
usually communication is rare. 
Embryo adoption does not involve the same legal process as adopting a child.291 Legally, 
the same property and contract laws that govern embryo donation govern the adoption.292 
Practically, though, the organizations that conduct embryo adoptions treat the transaction like a 
traditional adoption process.293 These agencies often require that “[p]rospective adoptive parents 
entering an embryo adoption program [] complete an application, traditional adoption home study, 
                                                                  
agreement between a divorcing couple to donate cryogenically preserved embryos to IVF research); Davis v. Davis, 842 
S.W.2d at 588 (holding that each party’s interest in the disposition of a cryogenically preserved embryo must be weighed 
and that “[o]rdinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail” in a dispute); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 
40 (Tex. App. 2006) (enforcing a contract drafted before the IVF procedure began, which called for cryogenically 
preserved embryos to be discarded in the event of divorce). 
285 See Lobron, supra note 201. 
286 See Susan L. Crockin, Myths About Embryo Donation, RESOLVE, http://www.resolve.org/national-
infertility-awareness-week/myths-about-embryo-donation.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2014) (describing the differences 
between embryo donation and embryo adoption, and noting that embryo donation may be “fully open” or anonymous and 
frequently involves fewer restrictions on the recipient). 
287 See Adopter FAQs, EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CENTER, http://www.embryoadoption.org/adopters/ 
adopting_parent_faq.cfm (last visited Apr. 6, 2014) (detailing the requirements of embryo adoption, including background 
checks, medical checks, and home visits); Embryo Adoption Education Outline, NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, 
http://www.nightlight.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Embryo_Adoption_Education.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2014); 
Required and Recommended Booklist: Domestic and Embryo Adoptions, NIGHTLIGHT CHRISTIAN ADOPTIONS, http:// 
www.nightlight.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Embryo_adoption_booklist.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
288 See Crockin, supra note 286 (comparing state embryo donation guidelines to those for sperm and egg 
donation). 
289 See Embryo Donation, NAT’L EMBRYO DONATION CENTER, http://www.embryodonation.org/ 
index.php?content=donation (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
290 Id.  
291 EMBRYO ADOPTION AWARENESS CENTER, supra note 287 (explaining that “current adoption law only 
applies to the placement of a child after they are born). 
292 See Polina M. Dostalik, Embryo ‘Adoption’? The Rhetoric, the Law, and the Legal Consequences, 55 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 867, 869-71 (2011) (discussing the lack of legal status of embryo adoption). 
293 Id. at 869-70. 
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adoption education program, undergo health checks, and pay a fee.”294 None of which is legally 
required for transferring an embryo from the progenitors to another individual or couple.295 By 
applying traditional adoption principles to embryos, embryo adoption agencies such as Nightlight 
treat embryos like living children, conferring a personhood status onto the embryos. 
B.  Embryo Adoption is a Religious Construct That Confers a Personhood Status  
onto the Embryos 
In the United States, some agencies that provide embryo adoption services hold the view 
that each embryo is a “person”, and the agencies’ adoption practices are motivated by this 
belief.296 The Religious Right and the religiously motivated pro-life movements fully embrace the 
view that life begins at conception, and believe that every embryo should be treated as a “person” 
under the law.297 
Some Christians believe that it is their duty to adopt unneeded embryos because the IVF 
process creates a child, “a human being, a person, who, although created in a laboratory, was 
nevertheless created by God.”298 Christian, particularly Catholic, scholars argue that the 
separation of the sex act and procreation is inherently immoral.299 In order to continue the 
development of stem cell research, though, some personhood advocates have differentiated 
between the “life” of an embryo fertilized in vivo, or in the womb, versus in vitro, outside the 
womb.300 However, this differentiation is rare and most advocates believe that embryos created in 
vitro require the status of a full moral person.301 
Overall, there is not a secular argument for treating an embryo as a full moral person. 
Embryos created through IVF are particularly difficult to justify as a full person in a secular 
framework because the embryos do not possess the secular traits of personhood such as sentience 
and consciousness.302 Instead, a secular framework differentiates between the human life and 
                                                                  
294 Id. at 874. 
295 Id. 
296 See id. at 870; What’s the Difference Between the Terms Donation and Adoption?, EMBRYO ADOPTION 
AWARENESS CENTER, http://www.embryoadoption.org/adopters/terminology.cfm (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). Christian 
donation agencies often use religious rhetoric to describe their operation; for example, Embryo Adoption Awareness 
Center suggests, “For the family wanting to parent the children born from such a gift [embryo donation], the term 
'adoption' makes more emotional sense.” Id. “You will be giving birth to a child. Adoption is the term that both legally and 
socially explains the transfer of parental rights associated with a traditional adoption.” Id. 
297 See supra Part I.D. 
298 Embryo Adoption, AMERICAN LIFE LEAGUE, www.all.org/nav/index/heading/OQ/cat/NTk/id/NDc2NA 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
299 See Carl Cohen, Sex, Birth Control, and Human Life, 79 ETHICS 251, 252–53 (1969) (describing the 
Catholic views that sex and procreation are intrinsically intertwined and it is immoral to separate the concepts as a 
justification against using contraceptives); Arthur L. Greil, The Religious Response to Reproductive Technology, 
CHRISTIAN CENTURY (1989) (arguing that some Christians, particularly Catholics, oppose IVF because of the separation 
of the sex act from procreation). 
300 Gregoratos, supra note 273, at 986 (“Those who have accepted the theory of hominization would not find 
research on spare embryos morally repugnant as long as the research took place prior to the moment of ensoulment.”). 
301 See Christi D. Ahnen, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: Who Wins, Who Loses, and How Do We Decide?: 
An Analysis of Davis v. Davis, York v. Jones, and State Statutes Affecting Reproductive Choices, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
1299, 1300 (1991) (describing personhood objections to IVF). 
302 See CHRISTOPHER KACZOR, THE ETHICS OF ABORTION: WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN LIFE, AND THE 
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personhood elements of an embryo.303 There is agreement that biological human life begins at 
conception, but that the qualities that make an embryo a person happen at another point in time.304 
Since the view that personhood begins at conception is rooted in religion, not secular ethics, and 
embryo adoption is commonly performed because of a belief in the personhood of an embryo, 
entire concept of embryo adoption is an inherently religious construct. 
IV.  MARYLAND STATE-ENDORSED “EMBRYO ADOPTION” IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution both protects an individual’s 
right to practice their religious beliefs freely and prohibits the establishment of a state religion.305 
Despite the attempt to avoid religious tension,306 the Establishment Clause jurisprudence is 
considered “inconsistent and unprincipled” by many Constitutional scholars.307 While some argue 
that the Supreme Court’s motivation behind such unpredictable Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is a reliance on modern exigencies,308 this article focuses only on the 
constitutionality of embryo adoption under current Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 
First, this section will describe modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence—
specifically, the concept of impermissible religious entanglement.309 Then, this section will argue 
that § 10–438 of the Maryland Stem Cell Research Act is a state endorsement of embryo 
adoption—a religious construct—and is unconstitutional.310 
A.  The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment Prohibits the State  
from Endorsing Religion 
The Supreme Court did not decide many cases under the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment prior to the 1940s, when several cases were decided on Establishment Clause 
grounds as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment.311 The first modern Establishment Clause 
case, Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, found that a statewide New Jersey 
                                                                  
QUESTION OF JUSTICE 56 (2011) (describing common secular characteristics of personhood). 
303 STEINBOCK, supra note 189, at 52-55 (describing the moral difference between “human” and “person” 
when describing embryos). 
304 Id. 
305 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof…”). 
306 William J. Cornelius, Church and State—The Mandate of the Establishment Clause: Wall of Separation 
or Benign Neutrality?, 16 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 3 (1984) (“The religion clauses were designed to avoid rather than cause 
trouble.”). 
307 Id. at 8. 
308 Id. at 8–9. 
309 See infra Part IV.A. 
310 See infra Part IV.B. 
311 Naomi Rivkind Shatz, Unconstitutional Entanglements: The Religious Right, the Federal Government, 
and Abstinence Education in the Schools, 19 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 495, 499 (2008). “Despite the well-established idea 
of a separation between church and state in American law, the Supreme Court has only decided seventy cases on 
Establishment Clause grounds.” Id. ‘Few cases were decided under the Establishment Clause before the First Amendment 
was made applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment in 1940.” Id. 
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program providing students with bus fares to both public and parochial schools did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.312 Because the parochial schools receiving bus services met state secular 
educational guidelines and because the treatment of public and parochial school transportation 
was the same, the New Jersey busing system did not violate the Establishment Clause.313 
Significantly, the Everson Court found: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can . . . force [an individual] to 
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs . . . [since] the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect “a wall of 
separation between Church and State.”314 
Although this firm belief in separation of Church and State still resonates today as a primary 
reason behind the Establishment Clause, the Everson Court upheld the use of state taxpayer 
money in the busing scheme because a state was required to be neutral toward, and not an 
adversary to, religion.315 While the Everson Court in dicta noted some instances in which state 
funds can provide a benefit to a religious group,316 the Court did not provide a framework for 
determining whether those benefits violate the Establishment Clause until decades later, in Lemon 
v. Kurtzman.317 
The Lemon test—a multi-factor test to determine if a law violates the Establishment 
Clause—remains the primary test for constitutionality under the Establishment Clause.318 Under 
the Lemon test’s three-pronged analysis, a statute complies with the Establishment Clause if 1) it 
has a secular legislative purpose; 2) its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion; and 
3) it does not “foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”319 
In 1985, Justice O’Connor advocated a refinement to the first prong of the Lemon test in 
a concurring opinion to Lynch v. Donnelly.320 Lynch enhances the secular legislative purpose 
prong of the Lemon test by creating a separate endorsement test.321 The endorsement test requires 
a court to examine “whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or 
disapproval of religion.”322 The Court solidified the endorsement test in the 2005 case, Van Orden 
v. Perry, which challenged the erection of a monument of the Ten Commandments on the grounds 
of the Texas State Capitol.323 Finding that the monument had historical significance outside of the 
religious context, the Van Orden Court concluded that the monument did not violate the 
                                                                  
312 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947). 
313 Id. at 17-18. 
314 Id. at 15–16 (citation omitted). 
315 Id. at 18. 
316 Id. at 16-18. 
317 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
318 See Shatz, supra note 311, at 499. 
319 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. 
320 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
321 Id. at 690-92. 
322 Id. at 691. 
323 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005). 
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Establishment Clause.324 In sum, a law will pass the purpose prong of the Lemon test as long as it 
has a secular purpose. 
The second prong of the Lemon test, the effect of the law, has also been refined through 
further case law. In McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, the Court held that a display of the 
Ten Commandments in “a very high traffic area” of a Kentucky county courthouse violated the 
Establishment Clause.325 The McCreary Court found that the effect of the local law requiring 
display was religious because an “objective observer” standard showed that a reasonable person 
would conclude it was a government endorsement of a religion.326 
The final prong to the Lemon test, government entanglement, is one that has been 
construed very differently by different justices—making its application sometimes difficult to 
predict.327 In Aguilar v. Felton, the Court struck down a New York program that sent public 
teachers to a parochial school to teach remedial processes holding the program required excessive 
entanglement to be sure state funds were not used for religious purposes.328 Dissenting from the 
Aguilar opinion, Justice O’Connor would have upheld the program instead of invalidating it 
“merely because it requires some ongoing cooperation between church and state or some state 
supervision to ensure that state funds do not advance religion.”329 Later, in Agostini v. Felton, the 
Court revisited the Aguilar case and overturned the prior ruling, finding that it had become 
inconsistent with subsequent Establishment Clause jurisprudence.330 
The Supreme Court has declined to apply the Lemon test in a few specific instances.331 In 
a case addressing the constitutionality of opening each session of the Nebraska legislature with a 
clergy-led prayer, Marsh v. Chambers, the Court emphasized the importance of tradition and 
history of the religious practice.332 While the Marsh opinion did not overturn the Lemon test, 
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from the ruling because the court had explicitly not 
followed the formal test established in Lemon333—which likely would have led to invalidation of 
the Nebraska practice. Despite these refinements and other holdings, the Lemon test is still the 
best assessment of the constitutionality of laws under the Establishment Clause.334 
B.  Section 10–438 of the Maryland Stem Cell Research Act is an Impermissible State 
Endorsement of “Embryo Adoption” and is Unconstitutional 
The Maryland Stem Cell Research Act (MSCRA) was intended to allow funding for 
                                                                  
324 Id. at 690. 
325 McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, 851, 870 (2005). 
326 Id. at 862-63. 
327 Amy J. Alexander, When Life Gives You the Lemon Test: An Overview of the Lemon Test and Its 
Application, 3 PHX L. REV. 641, 661–62 (2010). 
328 Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 404, 414 (1985). 
329 Id. at 421, 430 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
330 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208-09 (1997). 
331 See Shatz, supra note 311, at 500 (noting that some Justices have offered up their own Establishment 
Clause tests). 
332 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784, 792 (1983) (holding that the historical establishment of the 
Nebraska legislature, and the historical context surrounding the evolution of the clause, posed “no real threat”). 
333 Id. at 795-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
334 Shatz, supra note 311, at 500. 
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ethical stem cell research in Maryland,335 and is the only Maryland law governing the disposition 
of unused reproductive material from IVF.336 Specifically, § 10–438 of the MSCRA requires IVF 
practitioners to educate their patients about options for unused material from fertility treatment.337 
By statute, the IVF practitioners must present patients with the options of “(i) storing or 
discarding any unused material; (ii) donating any unused material for clinical purposes in the 
treatment of infertility; (iii) . . .donating any unused material for research purposes; and (iv) 
donating any unused material for adoption purposes.”338 The concept of embryo donation as a 
means of assisting others for fertility purposes—similar to the donation of other materials such as 
sperm and eggs—is fully encompassed by the second clause.339 This makes the final clause, 
regarding donation for adoption purposes340 superfluous for the goal of educating patients about 
their option to donate excess embryos to others for infertility treatment. This indicates that the 
final clause serves no separate, secular purpose other than educating patients about the availability 
of religious embryo adoption in the state. 
The religious motivation behind embryo adoption in the MSCRA is clearly present in its 
legislative history. A review of the MSCRA’s legislative history shows a great deal of activism 
within the religious community in both support of and opposition to the law.341 The only materials 
provided supporting the term embryo adoption, both in testimony and letters to the legislature, 
were from religiously motivated groups.342 Notably, major religious groups such as the United 
Methodist Church and the Maryland Jewish Alliance supported the bill as a way to conduct 
                                                                  
335 MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 10-434(b) (LexisNexis 2008). 
336 MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 10-438(a) (LexisNexis 2008). 
337 Id. (creating a duty for IVF practitioners to counsel patients about disposition options for unused 
reproductive material). 
338 Id. at § 10-438(a)(2). 
339 Id. at § 10-438(a)(2)(ii) (“donating any unused material for clinical fertility purposes”). 
340 Id. at § 10-438(a)(2)(iv). 
341 See Bill File, SB 144/HB 1: Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, Reg. Sess. Md. Gen. Assembly 
(2006) (Letter from Nancy E. Fortier, Maryland Catholic Conference, dated Feb. 27, 2006) (objecting to S.B. 144 on 
moral grounds that it does not prevent the implantation of a cloned embryo); Bill File, SB 144/ HB 1: Maryland Stem Cell 
Research Act of 2006, Reg. Sess. Md. Gen. Assembly (2006) (Testimony of David Whitney, Pastor of Cornerstone 
Evangelical Free Church of Pasadena, Md.) (asserting that his daughter had personhood status when she was a four cell 
embryo, and implying that it would have been immoral for her to have been “killed” at that stage of development); Bill 
File, SB 144/HB 1: Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, Reg. Sess. Md. Gen. Assembly (2006) (Testimony of 
Bishop John R. Schol, United Methodist Church, dated Jan. 25, 2006) (supporting the use of unused embryos for research 
as long as they 1) would otherwise be discarded, 2) the progenitors have given their informed consent, and 3) the embryos 
were not purchased, or 4) deliberately created for research); Bill File, SB 144/HB 1: Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 
2006, Reg. Sess. Md. Gen. Assembly (2006) (Letter from Don Schroeder, Bishop’s Deputy for Pub. Pol’y, Episcopal 
Diocese of Md., dated Jan. 25, 2006) (supporting S.B. 144 because it creates sufficient ethical grounds for genetic research 
while prohibiting human cloning); Bill File, SB 144/HB 1: Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, Reg. Sess. Md. Gen. 
Assembly (2006) (Testimony of Md. Jewish Alliance, dated Jan. 25, 2006) (supporting stem cell research as a way to 
alleviate human suffering while recognizing that a blastocyst is not a person). 
342 See Bill File, SB 144/ HB 1: Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, Reg. Sess. Md. Gen. Assembly 
(2006) (Testimony of David Whitney, Pastor of Cornerstone Evangelical Free Church of Pasadena, Md.) (asserting that his 
daughter had personhood status when she was a four cell embryo, and implying that it would have been immoral for her to 
have been “killed” at that stage of development); Bill File, SB 144/HB 1: Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, Reg. 
Sess. Md. Gen. Assembly (2006) (Letter from Leigh Heller, Legislative Dir. of Md. Right to Life, dated Jan. 19, 2006) 
(advocating “adoption” of “snowflake babies,” a term used by many embryo adoption agencies). 
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therapeutic stem cell research to alleviate human suffering—thereby rejecting the view that an 
embryo is a person.343 Only Catholics and Evangelicals actively opposed the bill on the grounds 
that personhood begins at conception.344 The most ardent advocates for “embryo adoption” were 
the Maryland Right to Life members who directly opposed embryonic stem cell research and the 
discarding of excess embryos because it “killed” them.345 
The MSCRA’s use of the term embryo adoption is unconstitutional under the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The statute fails every prong of the Lemon test. 
First, IVF practitioners educating patients about embryo adoption violate the secular purpose 
prong. Second, the primary effect of the law is an advancement of a specific religious view of 
personhood, one that is not supported by other major Christian sects. Finally, the statute 
constitutes excessive state entanglement in religion. 
Embryo adoption in the MSCRA does not serve a secular purpose. To overcome the first 
prong of the Lemon test, a “statute must have a secular legislative purpose.”346 In assessing a 
statute’s secular legislative purpose, the Van Orden endorsement test is applied to determine 
“whether government’s purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute actually conveys a 
message of endorsement.”347 As previously established, embryo adoption is a religious construct 
used by embryo personhood advocates to advance the view of personhood as beginning at 
conception—a relatively new concept in several major sects of Christianity.348 The embryo 
donation encompasses the same practical actions while maintaining that an embryo is either 
property or property owed special consideration due to its ability to produce human life.349 Using 
the term embryo adoption instead of embryo donation endorses the religious view that an embryo 
is a person. Additionally, the legislative history of the MSCRA indicates that the only proponents 
of using the term embryo adoption in addition to embryo donation were religious and other pro-
personhood organizations.350 
The statute also fails the second prong of the Lemon test because the primary effect of 
                                                                  
343 Bill File, SB 144/HB 1: Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, Reg. Sess. Md. Gen. Assembly 
(2006) (Testimony of Bishop John R. Schol, United Methodist Church, dated Jan. 25, 2006) (supporting the use of unused 
embryos for research as long as they 1) would otherwise be discarded, 2) the progenitors have given their informed 
consent, and 3) the embryos were not purchased, or 4) deliberately created for research); Bill File, SB 144/HB 1: Maryland 
Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, Reg. Sess. Md. Gen. Assembly (2006) (Testimony of Md. Jewish Alliance, dated Jan. 25, 
2006) (supporting stem cell research as a way to alleviate human suffering while recognizing that a blastocyst is not a 
person). 
344 See Bill File, SB 144/HB 1: Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, Reg. Sess. Md. Gen. Assembly 
(2006) (Letter from Nancy E. Fortier, Maryland Catholic Conference, dated Feb. 27, 2006) (objecting to S.B. 144 on 
moral grounds that it does not prevent the implantation of a cloned embryo); Bill File, SB 144/ HB 1: Maryland Stem Cell 
Research Act of 2006, Reg. Sess. Md. Gen. Assembly (2006) (Testimony of David Whitney, Pastor of Cornerstone 
Evangelical Free Church of Pasadena, Md.) (asserting that his daughter had personhood status when she was a four cell 
embryo, and implying that it would have been immoral for her to have been “killed” at that stage of development). 
345 See Bill File, SB 144/HB 1: Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, Reg. Sess. Md. Gen. Assembly 
(2006) (Letter from Leigh Heller, Legislative Dir. of Md. Right to Life, dated Jan. 19, 2006) (advocating “adoption” of 
“snowflake babies,” a term used by many embryo adoption agencies). 
346 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. 
347 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67, 69 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The standard, first articulated 
in Jaffree, was adopted by the Van Orden Court as part of the Lemon test. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 682-83. 
348 See supra Part III.B. 
349 See supra Part III.A. 
350 See sources cited supra notes 341-45. 
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the statute is to advance the specific religious view that an embryo is a person. Maryland law 
rarely addresses ARTs, but recent developments strongly support the conclusion that Maryland’s 
policy treats embryos like property, and not as persons.351 The state actively endorses the use of 
ARTs that are likely to create excess embryos, as shown by the requirement that health insurers in 
Maryland cover up to three IVF treatments per live birth, or $100,000 of treatment over a 
lifetime.352 Applying a personhood status to embryos, as MSCRA § 10–438(a)(2)(iv) does, is 
contradictory to these other policy options, as it would severely limit the ability of Marylanders to 
access infertility services like IVF.353 
Finally, the statute fails the third prong of the Lemon test by impermissibly entangling 
the government and religion. The degree of entanglement between religion and government is 
difficult to determine, but courts generally determine it based on state public policy grounds.354 
Although Maryland was heavily influenced by Catholics during colonial times,355 modern 
Maryland has become much more secular and opposed to such levels of entanglement. Currently, 
Maryland is very friendly toward all ARTs356 and has embraced the diverse composition of 
families in modern America.357 Adopting such a staunch view of personhood would be 
contradictory to these public policy goals. In sum, the MSCRA’s use of embryo adoption fails 
every element of the Lemon test in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
C.  An Easy Remedy: Revising the Maryland Stem Cell Research Act 
Remedying the unconstitutionality of MSCRA § 10–438(a)(2)(iv) is a simple task. As 
previously established, the unconstitutional section is superfluous to the core goals of the 
MSCRA.358 The purpose behind MSCRA § 10–438 is to educate IVF patients about the options 
available for the disposition of unused reproductive material, while simultaneously creating an 
                                                                  
351 See Kristi Tousignant, Judge: Mother Gets Frozen Embryos, MD. DAILY REC. (Jan. 2, 2013), 
http://thedailyrecord.com/2013/01/02/judge-mother-gets-frozen-embryos (describing a recent Prince George’s County 
case that found cryogenically preserved embryos were not marital property to be divided in a divorce dispute because the 
disposition of the embryos is governed by a contract both progenitors created before undergoing infertility treatment. The 
dispute is the first Maryland case addressing the disposition of cryogenically embryos in divorce). 
352 MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15–810(d) (LexisNexis 2011). 
353 See supra Part.II.C.  
354 See Cornelius, supra note 306, at 3-4. 
355 See Tricia T. Pyne, The Politics of Identity in Eighteenth-Century British America: Catholic Perceptions 
of Their Role in Colonial Society, 15 U.S. CATH. HIST. 1, 3–4 (1997) (describing the Catholic influence in Maryland based 
on the Catholicism of founding Lord Baltimore in 1634, and the fact that 10 percent of Marylanders in the period were 
Catholic). 
356 See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15–810 (requiring health insurance coverage for IVF); Hilary Neiman, 
Maryland: A Friendly Surrogacy State, INT’L COUNCIL INFERTILITY INFO. DISSEMINATION (Nov. 18, 2009), http:// 
www.inciid.org/article.php?cat=thirdparty&id=782 (last visited Apr. 6, 2014) (noting that Maryland allows traditional and 
gestational surrogacy for all persons). 
357 See Brian Witte, Many Weddings as Gay Marriage Becomes Legal in Md, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 1, 
2013) (describing the beginning of legal gay marriage in Maryland after voters supported the measure in the 2012 election, 
the first time in the United States that gay marriage was established by popular vote); Editorial Staff, Maryland Should 
Embrace Gay Adoption, BALT. SUN (Nov. 14, 2011), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-11-14/news/bs-ed-gay-
adoption-20111114_1_gay-adoption-adoptions-by-unmarried-couples-address-adoptions (describing current state embrace 
of gay adoption in certain jurisdictions, like Baltimore City, and encouraging statewide support). 
358 See supra Part IV.B. 
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avenue for ethical stem cell research through an informed donation process.359 Sections of the 
statute already encompass patient education of donating excess embryos to others for infertility 
treatment, making the embryo adoption section unnecessary for reaching that goal.360 Therefore, 
the best solution for remedying the constitutionality of MSCRA § 10–438 is to simply strike 
MSCRA § 10–438(a)(2)(iv) from the law. By removing just this section of the statute, the secular 
intent and effect of the law will be unchanged. Striking the section would only remove the policy 
confusion made by conveying a personhood status to embryos—in contravention of state public 
policy. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Maryland Stem Cell Research Act was established to promote ethical stem cell 
research in Maryland in response to President George W. Bush’s restrictive policies, which were 
motivated by his personal, religious view that life begins at conception. Influenced by the 
lobbying of religious organizations, the Maryland General Assembly incorporated the concept of 
embryo adoption into the act, contrary to other Maryland state laws and general public policy. 
Adoption conveys a personhood status onto embryos and is inherently religious. General concerns 
regarding the designation of an embryo as a person—as shown by other state personhood 
initiatives—would create the most restrictive reproductive rights policies since the Comstock era 
and have a chilling effect on the lucrative Assisted Reproductive Technology industry. Under the 
Lemon test, MSCRA §10–438(a)(2)(iv) is an unconstitutional state endorsement of religion that 
violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. To remedy the unconstitutionality of 
the statute, Maryland should strike MSCRA §10–438(a)(2)(iv) from the law while maintaining 
the rest of the act. 
 
                                                                  
359 See MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 10-438(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2008). 
360 See MD. CODE ANN., ECON. DEV. § 10-438(a)(2)(ii) (LexisNexis 2008). 
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